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A BARGAINING DYNAMIC TRANSACTION
COST APPROACH TO UNDERSTANDING
FRAMEWORK CONTRACTS
JULIET P. KOSTRITSKY*
This Article recognizes that the new production innovation economy has
spurred the adoption of the long-term agreement (“LTA”) with its information
sharing protocols. Those information sharing protocols help parties navigate
uncertainty and promote informal enforcement. Despite the advantages,
preliminary empirical data suggests that parties continue to use alternatives to
the LTA. To explain the use and non-use of LTA’s in the supply chain, this
Article suggests a bargaining lens explanation. Each party in the supply chain
will seek to solve durable problems of opportunism under conditions of
uncertainty and will adopt a particular type of contract (LTA or alternative)
only if the benefits of achieving the parties’ goals through that contract form
outweigh the costs. Firms constantly seek a way to minimize costs while
maximizing contractual benefits. That search underlies the deliberate choice of
some suppliers to opt into or out of an LTA because they do not see the new
benefits of the LTA to be greater than the net benefit of an alternative. This
bargaining lens theory will also provide guidance on whether and how the law
should formally sanction parties. Finally, the Article will offer advice for lawyers
advising clients in the supply chain.

* Everett D. and Eugenia S. McCurdy Professor of Contract Law, Case Western
Reserve University School of Law. Elizabeth Connors, Jessica Ice, Rachel Ippolito, Steve
Kovacic, James Oliver, and Stephanie Starek provided extraordinary research help. Thanks
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INTRODUCTION: A BARGAINING LENS THAT EXPLAINS
THE RISE OF THE LTA AND THE PERSISTENCE OF ALTERNATIVES
AS A COST MINIMIZING STRATEGY
Long-term agreements (“LTAs”) in the supply chain, with their
information sharing provisions, have been heralded as a new way of doing
business.1 Recent scholars examining how these LTAs are structured
explain their emergence as a byproduct of a new deverticalized production
economy and the increased uncertainty in an innovation economy.2
Much of the literature examining LTAs in the manufacturing and
innovation context have conceptualized these agreements as a blend
of formal3 provisions that enable informal enforcement4 in a variety of
1. See Frank Mobus & Bill Sanders, Having Trouble Negotiating Successful Long-Term
Agreement?
Change Your Tactics!, SUPPLY CHAIN MGMT. REV. (June 3, 2016),
http://www.scmr.com/article/having_trouble_negotiating_successful_long_term_ag
reement_change_your_tact (suggesting that LTAs present a “real opportunity for
efficiency and savings” and highlighting the problem with short-term solutions).
2. See, e.g., JOSH WHITFORD, THE NEW OLD ECONOMY: NETWORKS, INSTITUTIONS,
AND THE ORGANIZATIONAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MANUFACTURING 18 (2005)
(describing a “shift” in the production economy throughout the twenty-first century);
Gillian K. Hadfield & Iva Bozovic, Scaffolding: Using Formal Contracts to Support Informal
Relations in Support of Innovation, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 981, 985 (providing a list of some of
the “pervasive uncertaint[ies]” in present-day innovation contacts).
3. See Ricard Gil & Giorgio Zanarone, Formal and Informal Contracting: Theory and
Evidence, ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 141, 142 (2017) (conceptualizing formality in terms
of verifiability to a “third party”).
4. See Ronald J. Gilson et al., Braiding: The Interaction of Formal and Informal
Contracting in Theory, Practice, and Doctrine, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1377, 1415–16 (2010)
[hereinafter Gilson et al., Braiding] (advocating that formal enforcement be “lowpowered” and suggesting that “parties’ specific investments in information” are left to
informal enforcement mechanisms).
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ways. Recent scholars have studied LTAs in two primary contexts: the
innovation economy and the standard form contract LTA in a
manufacturing context between Original Equipment Manufacturers
(“OEMs”) and automobile suppliers.5 These scholars have treated these
LTAs as a new phenomenon, and a new way of doing business that departs
from the vertically integrated firm.6 Instead of making parts, companies
now buy externally and enter contracts to govern their purchases.
Scholars of LTAs begin with the premise the premise that these LTAs
are all necessarily incomplete. In the context of innovation of a new
product that is yet undiscovered, the contract cannot specify performance
obligations because of the uncertainty about the final product. In the
manufacturing context, the uncertainty is different: it concerns whether
the supplier will effectively collaborate with the buyer to produce high
quality goods by participating in a process of learning by monitoring that
will improve both the quality and timeliness of production.
One response to this uncertainty in each setting is to provide formal
contract provisions that obligate the supplier or the innovator to share
information.7 Innovation scholars posit that although these
information sharing provisions are “formal,” they facilitate informal
enforcement that results in a “braiding” of formal contract provisions
and informal norms for enforcement.8 Some argue that such settings
call for “low-powered sanctions.”9 Others, such as Professor Matthew
Jennejohn, argue that braiding theory does not fully explain the
diversity of arrangements that include unanimity requirements for
decision making.10 He explains unanimity requirements as a specific
response to threats the parties face, such as entropy and spillover.11

5. See Robert Gibbons, Firms (and Other Relationships), in THE TWENTY-FIRSTCENTURY FIRM: CHANGING ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
186, 194–96 (Paul DiMaggio ed., 2001) (automobile industry); Hadfield & Bozovic,
supra note 2, at 995 (innovation economy).
6. See WHITFORD, supra note 2, at 17–18 (noting a trend toward more “networked
firm[s]” and examining sociologists’ explanations of long-term collaborations as the cause).
7. See Lisa Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts: Social Capital and Network
Governance in Procurement Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 561, 576–77 (2015) [hereinafter
Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts] (describing information sharing provisions as
“preconditions” to a cooperative contracting relationship).
8. Gilson et al., Braiding, supra note 4, at 1383.
9. Id. at 1415.
10. See Matthew Jennejohn, The Private Order of Innovation Networks, 68 STAN. L. REV.
281, 309–10 (2016).
11. Id. at 327.
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This Article takes a different approach, while still drawing on the
literature of these scholars. The arrangements parties enter into in a
variety of settings—to purchase or sell goods or to innovate on a
product—can best be understood in terms of a bargaining dynamic
that looks at how the private interests of the parties are turned into
joint interests in the agreement reached.
It is a mistake to talk about the form of a contract without first
understanding the bargaining needs and positions of the parties, and
how those needs get reflected in the form of the agreement, given the
options each party has. The form of the contract is not an end in itself.
As a result, to analyze the form that contracting takes, one must
understand the function that each party needs the contract to perform,
as well as the kinds of transaction costs that each party must minimize
if they want to go forward with their projects. These costs include
opportunism, asymmetric information, uncertainty, and other
frictions, such as entropy and spillover highlighted by Jennejohn.12
Each party approaches the bargaining with its own private goals and
will reach a bargain only if the benefits of achieving those goals—
through a particular contract type or form—outweigh the costs. This
means firms are constantly looking for a contract form that will
minimize their costs while maximizing contractual benefits.
This Article examines the choice of contractual form through this
lens of bargaining theory. The choice of contractual form depends on
how each of the parties defines its individual interests and its
willingness to sacrifice some of its interests in order to get a deal that
advances other interests—all in a cost minimizing way.
Explaining the choice of contractual form must also include one
factor that has previously been ignored in the literature: the need for
a document that functions as a planning tool for the transaction.13
This Article will also examine a range of reasons why parties would
enter written LTAs, including the benefits they offer of facilitating
planning while minimizing misunderstandings.14 The planning needs
of parties will be greater in some settings than others.
12. See id. at 314–15.
13. See E-mail from William C. Whitford, Professor Emeritus, Univ. of Wis. Sch. of
Law, to author (Nov. 7, 2017, 6:20 PM) [hereinafter Whitford E-mail] (on file with the
American University Law Review) (explaining that “[w]hen a new business
relationship is formed (or a new product is introduced into an existing relationship),
there is a great deal of planning by both sides”).
14. Id.
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Another purpose that may underlie the use of LTAs that take the
form of standard form contracts (SFKs) is centralizing the processes
and standards governing the sale of goods in a uniform document,
whose costs can be recouped by repeated use over multiple
transactions.15 The Article will suggest that certain types of LTAs that
take the form of SFKs drafted by OEMs offer other advantages such as
“centraliz[ing] decision-making.” SFKs by OEMs centralize “control
over terms that need to be standardized for various reasons.”16
Using the bargaining lens, this Article will seek to identify
explanations first for why parties to a transaction use a particular form,
such as a purchase order or an LTA, and second, whether they use an
LTA that is a bespoke contract or a SFK LTA. This Article offers a
transaction cost minimizing explanation to rationalize the choice of
form and particular provisions in terms of how the LTA or other formal
arrangement responds to problems that parties face when significant
obstacles hinder complete contractual solutions. The Article also
explores other functions of LTAs, such as planning and centralization
of uniform terms. The transaction cost minimizing explanation for the
choice of form that is tied to the lens of bargaining theory.
Although LTAs were initially thought to offer some security for
buyers for future business, LTAs now place more requirements on
suppliers than on buyers. Because buyers have been demanding more
from suppliers in return for less than a binding commitment, some
suppliers view the LTA as undesirable, prompting them to opt out of
signing one or to use different arrangements in certain settings.
This Article will also consider alternatives to using LTAs and will
suggest that parties deliberately choose among several options for
selling goods, including avoiding an LTA altogether, and it offers some
tentative explanations for why and when parties opt for alternatives to
the LTA paradigm with its information sharing protocols. Further, the
Article suggests that parties can rely on informal enforcement
mechanisms regardless of whether they opt for an LTA or another
means of exchanging goods such as a purchase order; therefore, there
must be other reasons to adopt an LTA. It will examine whether some
of the benefits offered by LTAs drafted by OEMs, such as centralized
control and planning and control of opportunism under conditions of
15. Id. That would benefit large manufacturers who engage in repeat buying
transactions with suppliers.
16. Id. One reason might be to offer assurances to suppliers that all suppliers are
treated equally. That might account for stickiness in the adopted terms.
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uncertainty, can be achieved by other written agreements such as
purchase orders, at least when those agreements reference elaborate
documents such as quality control manuals available on the internet.
This Article seeks to explain the “alliance diversity”17 arrangements
in the supply chain context as different means for controlling
contractual hazards while minimizing costs.
The total cost
minimization may explain why, in some contexts, “formal” LTA
contracts may be cost justified.18 Both automobile suppliers to OEMs
and parties involved in joint innovation use formal contracts that take
the form of LTAs.19 Although the context of these agreements differs,
what may have tied them together is that they both involve large sunk
costs, which means parties cannot exit easily. These costs arise from
the demand of OEMs for informational disclosures on cost and quality,
as well as large investments in parts for automobile manufacturers as
well as innovation funding partners in the biotech and pharmaceutical
arena demanding information on research progress and investment.
Where, however, the product is fungible and can be easily resold,
parties may avoid the cost of LTAs and operate purchase order by
purchase order.20 Uncertainties exist in all three contexts concerning
product quality and reliability of the counterparty (and, in the
17. Jennejohn, supra note 10, at 282. Professor Jennejohn focuses on specific
governance mechanisms such as veto rights that do not serve the same purpose as the
information sharing protocols of “fostering informal constraints on opportunism.” Id.
Rather, Professor Jennejohn finds that there are diverse provisions which respond to
unique and “multivalent” hazards. Id. at 313. But see Hadfield & Bozovic, supra note
2, at 988 (explaining the diversity of arrangements in a different way). Hadfield and
Bozovic posit that parties in innovation contexts use formal and detailed contracts as
a means “to coordinate beliefs about what constitutes a breach of a highly ambiguous
set of obligations” when norms about what constitutes proper performance are
otherwise absent. Id. at 981. Establishing such coordination permits identification of
breaches and that in turn facilitates informal enforcement. Id. at 988 (“[F]ormal
contracting provides essential scaffolding to support the beliefs and strategies that
make informal means of enforcement . . . effective.”). This Article is concerned with
“alliance diversity” as well, but it focuses on alternative strategies for exchanging goods,
including the use and non-use of LTAs as the example.
18. Comments in survey refers to “administrative burden” of LTAs. Juliet P.
Kostritsky & Jessica Ice, LTA Survey (Default Report) (May 10, 2018) [hereinafter
Kostritsky & Ice Survey Results] (on file with the American University Law Review).
19. Of course, purchase orders and acceptances are an alternative contractual
arrangement that is no less “formal,” even though it may not contain as many
contractual provisions.
20. See Interview with General Counsel of large manufacturer (Feb. 22, 2017) [hereinafter
General Counsel Interview] (on file with the American University Law Review).
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innovation context, reliability of the product itself). There are ways of
achieving planning benefits without an LTA and ways of achieving
standardization through incorporating quality standards of excellence
available online. Thus, sunk costs may be the differentiating factor
that helps explain why automobile suppliers rely on LTAs, while
makers of other products (some fungible, some not) often do not.
The Article also suggests that using the bargaining dynamic to
understand the parties’ individual interests and their joint desire to
minimize transaction costs to maximize value can illuminate differences
in agreements on such matters as the structure for resolving disputes.
In the innovation context, unanimity is often required for decisions
made during the collaboration. Why would such unanimity be required
in such contexts? And why would many agreements not require such
unanimity?21 And why, despite the presence of LTAs in the automotive
setting, would a leading researcher suggest that LTAs are not elaborate
contractual mechanisms, but instead, a structure for learning by doing
and monitoring that revolves around information sharing and
benchmarking?22 Why would that less contractual, more pragmatic
approach that is premised on a way of operating, be a win-win approach
for OEMs but not for innovation collaborators? Jennejohn suggests one
answer to this conundrum based on the need to exclude a counterparty
from appropriating property.23 This Article suggests that a bargaining
theory lens transaction cost minimizing explanation that builds on the need
to protect property and sunk costs in situations where the uncertainty about
continuing relationships makes a long-term agreement without veto
provisions less satisfactory for controlling appropriation at the least cost.
The Article also explores why these frameworks break down, and it
ties both the diversity of arrangements and their possible breakdown
to legal enforcement issues. It addresses whether, when, and why, as
the contract innovation theorists suggest, legal remedies should be
21. See, e.g., Sun Microsystems, Inc., Sun Microsystems Int’l B.V., Mitac Int’l Corp.,
& Synnex Corp., Master Supply Agreement § 28.3 (May 1, 2007) [hereinafter Sun
Microsystems MSA], https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1177394/0001193
12507120639/dex101.htm (providing that upon failure to resolve disputes, either
party may seek legal remedy). The MSA does not mention any unanimity requirement
in the dispute resolution process. Id.
22. See Susan Helper et al., Pragmatic Collaborations: Advancing Knowledge While
Controlling Opportunism, 9 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 443, 445–46 (2000) (arguing that
collaborative development has become “more central to the activity and organization
of firms than the standard view allows”).
23. Jennejohn, supra note 10, at 324.
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restricted to “low-powered sanctions.”24 The bargaining dynamic lens
may also illuminate which enforcement mechanism would be
consistent with a transaction cost-value maximizing outcome for the
parties. To resolve that issue of enforcement and to resolve what
enforcement approach would be cost minimizing and value
maximizing, this Article engages literature on the role of law
intersecting with the informal enforcement of norms and analyzes both
the experimental literature on crowding out,25 the law and economics
of norms,26 and the purpose behind norms27 to ascertain the proper role
for law when informal enforcement exists in a contract with some formal
terms. It suggests that the bargaining lens may also offer insights into
what level of enforcement would be warranted in different settings.
Part I will analyze the origins of LTAs in the new industrial economy.
Part II will address the contracting obstacles parties face in all

24. See Gilson et al., Braiding, supra note 4, at 1415. Professors Gilson, Sabel, and
Scott advocate for the use of low-powered sanctions, at least in innovation contexts,
and suggest courts respond “in uncertain environments by enforcing the chosen
methods of mutual cooperation on terms consistent with the arrangements
themselves—that is, by imposing low-powered sanctions designed to encourage
compliance with the verifiable elements of the information exchange regime (and the
informal relations it supports).” Id. But see Hadfield & Bozovic, supra note 2, at 982
(suggesting that even where parties to a contract for innovation use formal contracts,
legal enforcement is largely irrelevant). The benefit to the formal contracts is not in
laying the groundwork for legal enforcement, but in clarifying the parties’ obligations
for the purpose of informal enforcement.
25. See Iris Bohnet et al., More Order with Less Law: On Contract Enforcement, Trust,
and Crowding, 95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 131, 132 (2001) (noting that “[l]egal rules can
‘crowd in’ as well as ‘crowd out’ preferences” for contract performance); see also Robert
E. Scott, The Promise and Peril of Relational Contract Theory, in REVISITING THE CONTRACTS
SCHOLARSHIP OF STEWART MACAULAY: ON THE EMPIRICAL AND THE LYRICAL 105, 112 n.35
(J. Braucher et al. eds., 2013) (discussing literature on crowding out phenomenon).
26. See Juliet P. Kostritsky, The Law and Economics of Norms, 48 TEX. INT’L L.J. 465,
467 (2013) (conceptualizing norms as “self-imposed constraints that parties use to
reduce . . . frictions” of exchange).
27. In some instances, norms exist to solve problems that are difficult to solve by
contract because state enforcement is weak, and the problem may be difficult to solve
by express contract. One such problem was how to constrain shirking and
opportunism by agents used by merchants in long-term trade among the Maghribi
traders when state enforcement was weak. See Avner Greif, Contract Enforceability and
Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders’ Coalition, 83 AM. ECON. REV.
525, 526 (1993). Norms arose to constrain the conduct of agents, and “[agency
relations] were governed by an institution that might be called a coalition. Expectations,
implicit contractual relations, and a specific information-transmission mechanism constituted
the constraints [and] supported the operation of a reputation mechanism.” Id.
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exchanges and the risks of opportunism in the supply chain that
parties want to control. Part III will examine the legal issues
surrounding these structures. Then Part IV will detail the distinctive
features of the information sharing and supplier excellence training
programs in many LTAs, examine whether these information sharing
protocols have always existed, and analyze if and why they were part of
the formal agreement. Next, Part V will examine alternative ways of
exchanging goods and suggest reasons why parties opt out of an LTA
but still achieve their long-term goals. Part VI will explore relational
contracts and parties’ positions in a network as mechanisms for
informal enforcement. Further, Part VI will consider how informal
enforcement can facilitate the transfer of information used to sanction
counterparties, regardless of whether the parties opt for an LTA or
another mode of exchanging goods. Part VII looks at network
governance as an alternative or supplement to relational contracts,
LTAs, and other supply chain relationships. Part VIII considers how
networks fail, the consequences of network failures, and potential
solutions for network failures. Part IX examines what the role of legal
enforcement should be when parties are using agreements that are
partially enforced by informal sanctions. Part X offers advice to lawyers
negotiating agreements concerning the supply of goods. Part XI
concludes that various types of arrangements will allow for informal
enforcement and can be beneficial for parties in the supply chain,
where informal enforcement breaks down, legal enforcement is
appropriate if cost minimizing.
I. DIFFERENCES IN SUPPLY CHAIN ARRANGEMENTS
A firm vertically integrates when it internally manufactures parts or
goods that are necessary for its final product.28 Alternatively, firms can
buy on the spot market29 or engage in a long-term relationship with
28. See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 392 (1937) (suggesting
that transaction costs might cause a company to produce rather than buy, thereby
explaining the origins of the firm). Professor Oliver Williamson expanded on this
notion of transaction costs by suggesting that opportunism was a friction or transaction
cost whose risk would cause a firm to vertically integrate. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE
ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 56,
91 (1985) [hereinafter WILLIAMSON, CAPITALISM] (explaining non-standard vertical
integration as a response to contractual hazard created by bilateral dependency).
29. See John Paul MacDuffie & Susan Helper, Collaboration in Supply Chains: With
and Without Trust, in THE FIRM AS A COLLABORATIVE COMMUNITY: RECONSTRUCTING
TRUST IN THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 417, 417 (Charles Heckscher & Paul S. Adler eds.,
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another autonomous entity to acquire the parts.30 The question of how
to obtain the parts or goods—the make or buy decision31—has
implications for the boundaries of the organization of the firm.32 One
problem with buying externally is that it leaves firms vulnerable to holdup
when there is bilateral dependency,33 which leads firms to vertically
integrate. While vertical integration could constrain opportunism by
suppliers, there are offsetting costs to integration.34
Inter-firm
arrangements to acquire goods are making a comeback due to the costs
of integration and the need for research and development firms to
collaborate on technology developments to reduce internal costs.35
Relations with external firms raise two issues. First, there is the
question of how the buy or sell decision will be arranged. If firms trade,
what types of formal contractual agreements will they use and why?
Two primary methods include: (1) exchanging a purchase order and
an acknowledgement, and (2) entering into a long-term agreement or

2006) (discussing buying on the spot market as likely to involve “low-bid competition”
and “low asset specificity”).
30. This Article will focus on bilateral agreements between parties in the supply
chain but will later consider whether the presence of a network will affect the analysis.
31. See Naomi R. Lamoreaux et al., Beyond Markets and Hierarchies: Toward a New
Synthesis of American Business History, 108 AM. HIST. REV. 404, 406 (2003) (detailing
Alfred Chandler’s explanation of the decision to make product internally in terms of
“competitive advantages” of the large firm who “could exploit economies of scope as
well as of scale by diversifying their operations into other industries”); see also Gibbons,
supra note 5, at 188 (suggesting that the “‘make-or-buy’ decision should instead be
viewed as ‘make or cooperate’ where both options involve important relational
contracts”); WILLIAMSON, CAPITALISM, supra note 28, at 91 (explaining the decision to
adopt non-standard vertical integration as a solution to the holdup problem).
32. See WHITFORD, supra note 2, at 32 (“The economics of organization is devoted
precisely to explaining when transactions are best coordinated by fiat within hierarchies and
when spontaneously in the market—that is, to explaining the boundaries of the firm.”).
33. See WILLIAMSON, CAPITALISM, supra note 28, at 114–15 (offering the vertical
integration of Fisher Body into General Motors as an example of a company
integrating to avoid supplier holdup). But see Helper et al., Pragmatic Collaborations,
supra note 22, at 459, 452–60 (explaining GM’s acquisition of Fisher Body as part of an
“effort to construct a variant . . . of a collaborative supplier system”).
34. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE 18 (1996) [hereinafter
WILLIAMSON, MECHANISMS] (recognizing that integration has costs “[b]ecause incentives are
degraded and because neither assent nor selective intervention agreements can be costlessly
enforced, acquisition gains are always attended by added bureaucratic costs”).
35. See Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Contracting for
Innovation: Vertical Disintegration and Interfirm Collaboration, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 431,
438 (2009) [hereinafter Gilson et al., Contracting for Innovation] (“[F]ear of holdups . . .
no longer compels firms to vertically integrate.”).
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an LTA.36 There is a separate question of what form the LTA will
take—will it be a SFK between an OEM and a supplier, or an individually
crafted innovation contract? Further, what types of governance
mechanisms, if any, exist for resolving disputes? Initially, the LTA had
offered suppliers some security for future business, but as buyers
imposed more onerous requirements in return for less than a binding
commitment, some suppliers are drawn to other arrangements.37
Second, what informal enforcement do parties use to enforce formal
(contractual) obligations, a phenomenon in the sale of goods first
empirically examined by Stewart Macaulay.38 Today, some scholars tie
informal enforcement to a change in the formal governing
agreements.39 These agreements include formal contract provisions
mandating the exchange of information between the parties.40 Some
scholars believe that changes in the LTAs, including information
exchange, herald a new way in which the sale of goods takes place.41

36. As a preliminary matter, we need to define terms to describe the parties in these
LTAs. The buyer is the customer who purchases goods from a supplier who manufactures
parts or other inputs for a buyer. The buyer may also be an original equipment
manufacturer like an airplane or a car manufacturer. The buyer and supplier are linked
in a supply chain defined as a network of firms involved in “designing, producing inputs
for, assembling and distributing a good.” Susan Helper, Supply Chain Data for the 2020’s:
Report Prepared for Economics and Statistics Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce (July
2016) (on file with the American University Law Review). In some subset of these
agreements, the parties may be involved in collaborating on a joint product.
37. See infra Part VII for a discussion of other arrangements not involving an LTA
or a purchase order.
38. See Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM.
SOC. REV. 55, 55 (1963). Other scholars have noted the importance of informal enforcement
intrafirm. See PETER M. BLAU & W. RICHARD SCOTT, FORMAL ORGANIZATIONS: A COMPARATIVE
APPROACH 6 (1962) (noting “[i]t is impossible to understand the nature of a formal
organization without investigating the networks of informal relations and the unofficial
norms as well as the formal hierarchy of authority and the official body of rules, since the
formally instituted and the informally emerging patterns are inextricably intertwined”).
39. See generally Gilson et al., Braiding, supra note 4, at 1382 (arguing that informal
obligations “interact within a formal governance structure” to regulate the exchange of
information without “impos[ing] legally enforceable obligations to buy or sell anything”).
40. See Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts, supra note 7, at 564–65. The information
shared may relate to a supplier’s finances, quality, and engineering capability. If the firms
are involved in collaboration and innovation, the information exchanged may also concern
investments in research or funding. See Gilson et al., Contracting for Innovation, supra note
35, at 436–37 (labeling the latter exchanges as “contracts for innovation”).
41. See id. at 435.
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These formal provisions for informational exchange in LTAs
facilitate informal enforcement.42 The information, when combined
with self-help provisions tied to the information, allows buyers to selfenforce, encourages cooperation,43 and increases trust levels.44 The
contracts for innovation, another form of LTA, also include benchmarks
for progress and funding obligations, as well as general provisions
obligating parties to act in good faith toward the development of a joint
product.45 These provisions all result in a braiding of formal contract
provisions and informal enforcement.46 This is because the provisions
enable all parties to self-enforce obligations, regardless of whether the
provisions set a standard that a supplier must meet in an excellence
manual, set compliance standards for the obligation to act in good faith
toward a product or research investment, or provide some other guidance
to the parties “to manage behavior during the life of the relationship.”47
By providing a formal contract provision in an LTA that references
excellence standards or provisions for “managing” obligations, the
parties have built-in standards48 to deal with uncertainty about the
quality or the product. The formal informational exchange, as well as
the innovation provisions guiding conduct and investment, all

42. Gilson et al., Braiding, supra note 4, at 1384 (attributing parties’ raised trust and
willingness to utilize informal enforcement mechanisms to the information sharing regime).
43. See Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts, supra note 7, at 576–78 (pointing out
that information exchanges encourage continued cooperation by helping avert
misunderstandings about what performance is expected). Dispute resolution
mechanisms in some LTAs play a similar role in discouraging conflict.
44. Id. at 593.
45. See Gilson et al., Contracting for Innovation, supra note 35, at 461 (examining the
components of John Deere’s “Achieving Excellence” governance mechanism and its
benchmarks).
46. Gilson et al., Braiding, supra note 4, at 1383–84 (classifying the information
sharing protocols as “neither fully formal nor fully informal”). Gilson, Sabel, and Scott
go on to explain that the protocols are not formal because they are not based on
calculated incentives applicable to performance obligations; and, they are not
informal because they are not “a gift relation, in which the parties simply and generally
pledge to exchange like (information) for like.” Id. at 1384.
47. Hadfield & Bozovic, supra note 2, at 987.
48. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557,
660 (1992) (distinguishing “rules” from “standards” based on the “extent to which
efforts to give content to the law are undertaken before or after individuals act”).
Kaplow clarifies that “[a] standard may entail leaving both specification of what
conduct is permissible and factual issues for the adjudicator.” Id.
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constrain opportunism by raising switching costs for both parties.49 If
either party has to switch to a new supplier or a new customer, that
party will have to explain their actions to a successor and bear the cost
of switching.50 In addition to constraining opportunism by facilitating
informal enforcement, LTAs may be valued because they provide a
positive benefit—they help to cement relationships with customers.51
One unanswered question is why manufacturers of fungible
products might operate purchase order by purchase order and eschew
LTAs.52 Can such parties self-enforce without a formal LTA, and can
they achieve the benefits of constraining opportunism and assuring
quality products without an LTA? Many of the provisions for assuring
quality do not need to be part of an LTA. Instead, a short form
purchase order can refer to a quality manual and require that, “[s]eller
also warrants that its processes shall comply with the buyer’s quality
manual and that all goods will comply with industry standards.53 Even
without entering into an LTA, a buyer can assure the same benefits of
quality assurance in goods and the processes by which they are
manufactured. By incorporating quality standards from the web, such
purchase orders can also achieve the advantages of the standardization
and buyer control of quality, which inhere in the SFKs between OEMs
and the automobile suppliers.
Some current scholars point to provisions in the LTA as a new means
of insuring informal enforcement or of coordinating agreement on

49. See WHITFORD, supra note 2, at 36–37 (noting that interfirm arrangements may
have “situational advantages over competing forms”).
50. Of course, switching costs occur whenever parties are doing business with one
another, since it will be costly to switch due to the costs of doing so. This would be
true regardless of whether an LTA is in place or not.
51. See Interview with $2 Billion Manufacturer (Aug. 22, 2017) [hereinafter $2
Billion Manufacturer Interview] (on file with the American University Law Review)
(citing the desire of one section of the company to negotiate LTAs to cement
relationships with customers who were not already doing business with the
manufacturer pursuant to Terms and Conditions or a purchase order). The desire to
conduct all business by LTAs was confined to one section of the company where the
LTA was viewed as a “relationship differentiator” with positive effects. Id. Other
sections of the company did not follow the practice of uniformly negotiating LTAs. Id.
52. See General Counsel Interview, supra note 20.
53. See, e.g., DEERE & CO., PURCHASE ORDER, TERMS AND CONDITIONS 2,
https://jdsn.deere.com/wps/wcm/connect/jdsn/e5ff9a43-66d2-49b8-af76-b4d20ff4a
817/purchasing_terms_and_conditions_mexico_eng.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CVID=lj8
Pgzs (last visited June 1, 2019).
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what constitutes a breach.54 But the same overall goals can be achieved
at a lower cost by simply requiring manufacturers to warrant in their
purchase orders that their goods meet the standards of excellence and
that its processes comply with buyer requirements. Such warranties
could help OEMs streamline provisions that all suppliers had to
comply with, thereby assuring suppliers of equal treatment.55
Despite these new arrangements, parties’ problems in exchanging
goods are durable. This Article examines what is new in the production
of products and the accompanying contractual agreements. However,
it posits that more can be learned by looking at what is durable in terms
of problems parties face, and by asking whether, and how, the new
practices in LTAs comprise new solutions to old problems. By looking
at the problems the parties face and then considering the individual
interests of the parties and the bargaining dynamic, one can analyze
why the parties would adopt various kinds of contracts with various
provisions in order to maximize value by controlling contractual
hazards at the least cost.56
In devising solutions to problems, parties confront significant
barriers that preclude the achievement of completely contingent
contracts.57 Moreover, judicial enforcement is too costly for most
parties to litigate most disputes.58 Parties have therefore always
resorted to a combination of formal contracts and informal
enforcement,59 even without the formal orchestrated information

54. See Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts, supra note 7, at 577; Gilson et al.,
Braiding, supra note 4, at 1383; Hadfield & Bozovic, supra note 2, at 988.
55. Whitford E-mail, supra note 13.
56. See WILLIAMSON, CAPITALISM, supra note 28, at 32–34 (outlining a “simple
contracting schema” for transaction cost economics).
57. See id. at 50–63 (detailing how asset specificity, bounded rationality, and
opportunism preclude completely contingent contracts); see also Steven Shavell,
Contracts, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 436 (Peter
Newman ed., 1998) (defining a complete contract as one in which “the list of
conditions on which actions are based is exhaustive”).
58. Macaulay, supra note 38, at 64. The costs of dispute resolution have caused
economists to question the validity of a system centered on legal centralism and
prompted consideration of alternative governance structures and dispute resolution
outside the legal system. See WILLIAMSON, CAPITALISM, supra note 28, at 20–21
(questioning the assumptions of legal centralism).
59. See BLAU & SCOTT, supra note 38, at 6. By 1962 it was uncontroversial (at least
among sociologists) that “[i]t is impossible to understand the nature of a formal
organization without investigating the networks of informal relations and the unofficial
norms as well as the formal hierarchy of authority and the official body of rules.” Id.
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exchange that is at the heart of many LTAs. Despite the incorporation
of information sharing in formal contract terms, the way parties
enforce matters pertaining to quality may not be significantly different.
What appears to be new is that the detailed information sharing
provisions that facilitate informal enforcement are part of a “formal
governance structure that regulates the exchange of highly revealing
information.”60 The new LTAs may lower the cost of such informal
enforcement by making more information observable.61 Of course, they
do entail other costs, such as the negotiation, lawyer, and drafting costs.
This Article differs from the contract innovation scholars and from
scholars like Professor Lisa Bernstein, who study standard form
contracts between OEMs and suppliers. Such scholars provide insight
on how the formal informational-transfer mechanisms can enhance
informal enforcement by making more actions observable,62 by
“coordinat[ing] beliefs about what constitutes a breach of a highly
ambiguous set of obligations,”63 increasing the number of actions to
observe,64 and by recognizing the ways in which the iterative actions
can “endogenize” trust65 and raise switching costs, thereby constrain
opportunism66 and make firms more competitive.67
This Article instead focuses on how the form of the contract reflects
the needs of the individuals to the bargain and the function that each
party needs the contract to perform, as well as the kind of transaction
costs parties must minimize in order to maximize value. Thus, in some
instances, parties in the supply chain may opt out of LTAs, even though

60. Gilson et al., Braiding, supra note 4, at 1382. Moreover, today, the product itself
or the quantity might remain uncertain, and the formal contract provisions might
relate to informational transfers while the product remains unspecified. See id.
61. See id. at 1386 (highlighting that the information exchange makes “capabilities
and character” observable). Once those matters are observable, switching costs are
higher. Higher switching costs constrain opportunism because a party would have to
expend resources to find a new partner.
62. Id. at 1399.
63. Hadfield & Bozovic, supra note 2, at 981.
64. Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts, supra note 7, at 592–93.
65. Gilson et al., Braiding, supra note 4, at 1386.
66. Gilson et al., Contracting for Innovation, supra note 35, at 486–89.
67. Jane K. Winn, Contractual Governance and the New Managerial Revolution 7
(Sept. 9, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the American University Law
Review); see also Gilson et al., Contracting for Innovation, supra note 35, at 440 n.22
(noting that Nokia’s success was attributed to its ability to its flexibility in meeting
“shifting market and competitive conditions”).
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they face many of the same uncertainties about the reliability of the
counterparty and the quality of the product being delivered.
Recognizing the inescapability of the opportunism problem is
central to understanding the parties’ choices among supply chain
agreements (a bespoke LTA or an SFK or opting out) and the related
legal enforcement issues.68 While the protocols for information transfer
enhance the buyer’s ability to compete, reduce uncertainties about
competence and reliability,69 and allow the supplier to furnish a credible
commitment, they can also leave the suppliers vulnerable to a buyer’s
opportunistic exploitation of the information shared, suggesting that
there are additional costs posed by these mechanisms. Under the
bargaining lens, those costs would be considered by parties weighing
whether their individual interests would be served by a joint agreement
that would minimize transaction costs to maximize value. Alternatively,
parties might consider whether the costs of the opportunism potential
would suggest that (1) either no LTA be agreed to, or (2) certain
provisions on cost sharing be omitted from the information protocols, or
(3) that the parties privately “hedge”70 by not fully cooperating or sharing
information to push back on opportunism potential.
Because preliminary research suggests that not all parties in the
supply chain of goods or product innovation utilize LTAs with formal
information sharing protocols,71 the question arises as to why and when
parties would adopt such provisions, or when alternative arrangements
might achieve their various goals at the least cost to maximize surplus.
68. See WILLIAMSON, CAPITALISM, supra note 28, at 30 (discussing opportunism as a
characteristic of human behavior).
69. Gilson et al., Braiding, supra note 4, at 1403–04 (discussing reliability); see also
WHITFORD, supra note 2, at 96 (discussing the importance of “competence uncertainty—the
problem of getting innovations from suppliers who were once asked only to execute”).
70. WHITFORD, supra note 2, at 85
71. General Counsel Interview, supra note 20. One factor is whether the risks to
the buyer from not having information about the reliability and competence of the
supplier are great enough to justify the transaction costs of the LTA and, further,
whether the risks are insurable. For example, if the buyer has a just-in-time production
scheme and the buyer’s competitiveness depends on the supplier making continuous
improvements and the buyer relies on benchmarking, etc., then the risks to the buyer of
not having a wealth of information about reliability, quality, and competence may justify
the investment of laying out the protocols in an elaborate LTA. A similar cost benefit
analysis for the supplier would assess whether the benefits of having an LTA outweigh the
costs. What additional protections or benefits does an LTA offer that a sale by purchase
order does not? What provisions are most important to a supplier and can they be achieved
in some other less costly means? What downsides exist to entering an LTA?
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The choice of a governance mechanism to contain opportunism where
asset specificity exists depends on which arrangement is least costly and
surplus maximizing. This Article offers some tentative suggestions tied
to bargaining theory, transaction costs, and asset specificity.
This Article will draw on research of others, as well as my own
interviews with Ohio manufacturers, to examine arrangements in
different settings72 and suggests some possible answers to the choices
about contractual form. I am researching the question of what
arrangements various manufacturers use in a survey of 1875
manufacturers in Ohio. By considering alternative arrangements in
the supply chain involving both standard products and customized
products involving large sunk costs, as well as innovation, this Article
seeks to explain different types of inter-firm arrangements using a
bargaining lens that considers the individual interests of the parties,
the particular context, the durable problems faced by parties, and the
transaction cost minimization of contractual hazard theory.
Highlighting “alliance diversity”73 in the supply chain, this Article
will examine how the parties can solve uncertainties of various types
and achieve their goals with or without formal protocols of information
sharing or investment guideposts. That choice of the particular
arrangement will also depend on whether that arrangement controls
contractual hazards and achieves the parties’ goals at the least cost,
thereby maximizing surplus for the parties.74 The value of the
information sharing must be considered in conjunction with why and
when the parties will opt for an LTA that includes information sharing
protocols, opt out of an LTA, or choose another alternative.75

72. These settings include: original equipment manufacturers and automotive
suppliers who routinely enter into such agreements; manufacturers of parts for the
airline industry, some of which are catalog orders; as well as intensely collaborative
ventures in the pharmaceutical industry.
73. Jennejohn, supra note 10, at 282.
74. WILLIAMSON, MECHANISMS, supra note 34, at 12 (emphasis added)
(“Transactions, which differ in their attributes, are aligned with governance structures,
which differ in their cost and competence, so as to effect a discriminating—mainly a
transaction cost-economizing—result.”); see also WILLIAMSON, CAPITALISM, supra note
28, at 1 (noting “the transaction cost approach maintains that these institutions [of
capitalism] have the main purpose and effect of economizing on transaction costs”).
75. The majority of companies taking our survey (54%) indicated that they utilize
MSAs and LTAs less than 26% of the time in their dealings (see the graph below). Of
the forty-seven companies that indicated that they ever used LTAs and MSAs, 30%
indicated their primary concern in terms of a future lawsuit would be a provision to
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Finally, the choice of how to organize the purchase and sale of goods
may depend on whether a large OEM customer with bargaining clout
demands that a supplier sign the OEM’s LTA. Thus, the power and
market dominance play a role in whether the parties exchange goods
using an LTA’s as some large buyers insist on them.76

PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS

protect capital equipment or tooling costs. Additional concerns included indemnity
for intellectual property infringement and damages caps.
MANUFACTURERS LTA/MSA USAGE
40%
33%
29%

30%
21%

17%

20%
10%
0%
0 - 10%

11% - 25%

25% - 75%

76% - 100%

FREQUENCY OF LTA/MSA USE

MANUFACTURERS LTA/MSA USAGE
PERCENTAGE OF LTA USAGE BY
RESPONDENT
MANUFACTURERS
COUNT
0% - 10%
21
11% - 25%
13
26% - 75%
18
76% - 100%
11
76. Survey results confirm this hypothesis. Kostritsky & Ice Survey Results, supra note 18.
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II. TIES TO THE NEW PRODUCTION ECONOMY:
THE DEMISE OF THE CHANDLERIAN FIRM
Framework LTA contracts are new in some ways; they are tied to the
new production economy and the de-verticalization of buyers. The
vertically integrated firm that used to predominate—the Chandlerian
firm—outsourced very little production except for fungible products.77
Firms did not want to outsource production with large sunk costs because
they feared that parties making important customized investments might
hold up the vertically integrated firm by demanding more money for
critical components.78 To avoid that holdup risk, firms in the early
twentieth century manufactured critical components inside the firm.79
However, in this new production economy, large buyers began to
outsource more products and production, as the high cost of research
and development has driven firms to collaborate with suppliers and
purchase externally.80 Although LTAs have existed between firms for
decades, the formal provisions in LTAs81 for orchestrated
informational exchange look different today because of changes in the
production economy that prompt closer collaboration on jointly
developed products.82 These collaborations comprise a network of firms
that exist between markets and hierarchies.83 As a result of deverticalization of firms, suppliers have become key players in producing
77. See Helper et al., Pragmatic Collaborations, supra note 22, at 444 (explaining Albert
Chandler’s “central theme . . . that the firm, and property in general, exist to reduce the
hazards of collaboration that could not efficiently be overcome in market exchange”).
78. See id. (discussing asset ownership as “powerful instruments for limiting the
extortion and deception that daunt cooperation”); see also id. at 451 (questioning
whether the automotive industry’s Fisher Body acquisition was because of hold up
concerns and suggesting a new rationale).
79. See id. at 455 (detailing the shift toward vertical integration in the automotive
industry between 1915 and 1925).
80. See id. at 448 (questioning General Motors’s takeover of the Fisher Body company in
1926 as “the prototypical example of vertical integration to overcome problems of hold-ups”).
81. See Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts, supra note 7, at 581–82 (“[I]t is not
uncommon for supplier qualification questionnaires to ask if the supplier is a
‘certified’ supplier to any of its customers . . . .”); see also id. at 583 (discussing buyers’
access to information from suppliers about “quality control systems and quality control
reports[] and . . . its books and/or other records”).
82. Gilson et al., Contracting for Innovation, supra note 35, at 449 (explaining that
there are significant challenges for contracting due to the need for “structuring
transactions in the face of continuous uncertainty”).
83. These firms may be autonomous but part of a network characterized by
information sharing, as well as “[a] mutual orientation” and the “exercise [of] voice
rather than exit.” WHITFORD, supra note 2, at 37.
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goods and collaborating.84 This change necessitates more complex
contractual arrangements to govern the cooperation necessary to produce
innovative goods or to enhance the quality of existing goods.85 In either
situation, development depends on inputs from each party.
Some of these protocols help buyers remain more competitive86 and
ideally permit suppliers and buyers to produce higher quality
products. The exchange of information serves different purposes. By
transferring knowledge, these protocols actually allow for a new way to
organize production that “involves an immense coordination of
specialized knowledge.”87 Sharing information in a creative venture
allows parties to collaborate on a complex project such as developing
a new airplane like the Boeing 787 “Dreamliner.”88 It permits buyers
to leverage information and expertise that they lack themselves,89
allowing companies to “leverage” the expertise of external suppliers,90
rather than developing it all in-house. This in turn reduces the costs
of production for the buyer.
Ideally, where there is a “mutual orientation,”91 these protocols can
facilitate “communication and problem solving.”92 The new frameworks
in these LTAs can expedite collaboration and innovation in these interfirm arrangements in a variety of ways. The information sharing

84. Helper et al., Pragmatic Collaborations, supra note 22, at 455–56
85. See Gilson et al., Braiding, supra note 4, at 1382 (noting that parties in multiple
industries use contracts that implement both formal and informal contracting to meet
the parties’ needs under uncertainty).
86. Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts, supra note 7, at 612; Winn, supra note 67, at 7.
87. WHITFORD, supra note 2, at 35.
88. See Christopher S. Tang & Joshua D. Zimmerman, Managing New Product
Development and Supply Chain Risks: The Boeing 787 Case, 10 SUPPLY CHAIN F. 74, 75, 77–
79 (2009) (describing how Boeing utilized a novel tiered supply chain to reduce the
time and cost required to develop the 787 “Dreamliner”).
89. See WHITFORD, supra note 2, at 17 (discussing OEM’s reliance on “suppliers’
specialized technology”).
90. Jennejohn, supra note 10, at 281 (“[A] collaborative approach gives a firm
access to external expertise without executing a full acquisition.”).
91. WHITFORD, supra note 2, at 37 (citing Walter W. Powell, Neither Market nor
Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organization, in 12 RESEARCH IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR
295, 303 (Barry M. Staw & L.L. Cummings eds., 1990)).
92. Id.
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protocols93 that characterize some LTAs are highly orchestrated and
help to transfer knowledge, cost data,94 and information about quality.
The transfer of information permits contracting when uncertainty
about what the final product will look like—a matter that is unknown
and unknowable ex-ante—precludes contracting on the final product.
The modern collaborative contract thus presents an additional species
of uncertainty not present when the product is fungible.
The arrangements governing the sale of goods examined here may,
but not always, involve highly “collaborative methods of innovation.”95
Regardless of whether collaboration is a key feature, all of these
arrangements exist between markets and hierarchies. Often, they
comprise long-term trading relations between autonomous partners.
The question is why the parties operating outside pure markets and
centralized hierarchies choose a particular form of alliance with a
particular contractual arrangement.
The knowledge sharing protocols that are at the heart of these LTAs
allow the buyers to produce higher quality end products. Because the
supplier is sharing information about quality during production, the
buyers can engage in error detection96 and make adjustments to improve
the quality of the production and head off problems before they arise,97
which allow parties to coordinate on who must invest at what point.98
Professors Ronald Gilson, Charles Sabel, and Robert Scott tie the
parties’ new arrangements to solving problems of information when

93. See Gilson et al., Braiding, supra note 4, at 1377; see also Bernstein, Beyond
Relational Contracts, supra note 7, at 581 (discussing “buyers’ practice of granting status
designations” to high performing suppliers with associated certain benefits of
increased access to “information sharing”).
94. However, one interviewee working at a large manufacturer indicated a real
reluctance to share cost data with customers. See Interview with Manufacturer (Aug.
24, 2017) [hereinafter Manufacturer Interview].
95. Jennejohn, supra note 10, at 281. The contract innovation scholars have applied their
analysis to Deere-Stanadyne supply contracts where innovation was only a potential issue for
future products. See infra Section IV.3; see also infra note 211 and accompanying text.
96. Helper et al., Pragmatic Collaborations, supra note 22, at 443, 446.
97. Id. at 445–46; see also Winn, supra note 67, at 18 (noting shifts in “focus from
arguing about who should bear the financial cost of mistakes to reducing the volume
of mistakes in the first place”). Sometimes it can lead to collaboration without trust in
which automakers outsourced mainly to cut costs. Later, automakers took a more
“strategic” approach to collaboration. Andrew Schrank & Josh Whitford, The Anatomy
of Network Failure, 29 SOC. THEORY 151, 165–66 (2011).
98. See Jennejohn, supra note 10, at 281, 307.
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there is a lack of preexisting trust in a highly uncertain environment99
and where reputational controls may not work. The information
sharing protocols “allow[] the parties to assess each other’s disposition
and capacity to respond cooperatively.”100 Jennejohn highlights the
benefits certain LTA provisions can have in solving previously
neglected contractual hazards, such as entropy and spillover.101 Unlike
Gilson, Sabel, and Scott—who find the concern over “the resolution of
the hold-up problem” to be “anachronistic”102—opportunism may still
be central for analyzing firms and their contractual arrangements
under conditions of uncertainty and contractual incompleteness.
III. DURABLE PROBLEMS CONFRONTING ALL EXCHANGES
AND THE CONTRACTING OBSTACLES
Regardless of the particular market forces operating on the supplier
and buyer, some of which might deepen the need for collaboration to
innovate, and some of which might lead to increased uncertainty about
a product itself, all parties in a supply chain face durable issues; the
parties need to control these problems in an efficient manner to
ensure high-quality goods.103
Focusing on the resolution of contractual hazards at the lowest cost
is central to understanding the variety of inter-firm arrangements, and
departs from the view that the braiding mechanisms mainly exist “as
tools for fostering informal constraints.”104 Instead, this Article posits
99. See Gilson et al., Contracting for Innovation, supra note 35, at 435 (explaining
that the high degree of uncertainty about the nature of the product that the parties
are collaborating on producing makes it impossible to specify the product ex ante).
100. Gilson et al., Braiding, supra note 4, at 1382.
101. Jennejohn, supra note 10, at 314 (explaining that entropy refers to the fact that
“resources must be spent to synchronize efforts and learning processes among team
members” and spillover refers to the fact that “parties cannot capture the full value of
their assets without spending resources defining and policing asset boundaries”).
102. Gilson et al., Contracting for Innovation, supra note 35, at 438.
103. Gary Herrigel, Emerging Strategies and Forms of Governance in High-Wage
Component Manufacturing Regions, 11 INDUSTRY & INNOVATION 45, 55 (2004) (“[I]t seems
clear that in the current environment of consistent vertical disintegration, OEMs have
a stable and consistent array of concerns: they need increasing amounts of
design/development capacity from suppliers, they require high levels of quality in
production, and they are desperately concerned with cost reduction. It is just that they
do not require an optimum of all three things from every relationship with
suppliers.”); see also Macaulay, supra note 38, at 63 (“One ought to produce a good
product and stand behind it.”).
104. Jennejohn, supra note 10, at 282.
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that the braiding mechanisms and the contracts are adopted to solve
problems or contractual hazards, while lowering the costs of achieving
those goals so as to maximize surplus. Parties will adopt information
transfer mechanisms and other LTA provisions only if doing so
improves informal enforcement and helps the parties achieve their
goals without imposing additional costs that outweigh the benefits of
information transfer mechanisms and other LTA provisions. In some
instances, informal enforcement will occur without the formal LTA
information transfer mechanisms.105 The question is why and when
will the formal information protocols in an LTA solve the parties
problems more effectively than if the protocols were not present.
In this broader comparative view, governance arrangements exist to
solve parties’ problems and must be evaluated for their effectiveness
and cost under Oliver Williamson’s discriminating alignment thesis.106
This broader view of governance is consistent with Jennejohn’s insight
that some contract provisions, such as veto rights, exist and can be
rationalized as devices that respond to “overlooked forms of transaction
costs” that Jennejohn labels “exchange hazards”107 such as entropy and
spillover, that only “multivalent” contract provisions can address.108
However, if entropy and spillover are problems that parties have, the
fundamental question is what mechanism or arrangements would
resolve those problems at the lowest cost. That is the central insight of
the “discriminating alignment” thesis.109
Accordingly, when
opportunism and spillover costs are involved in evaluating any
arrangement the parties enter to solve any problem, such as a formal
veto right, one should ask: Is that arrangement the most cost effective
way to establish foreground intellectual property rights in a way that is

105. That is the key insight of Macaulay and Williamson. The court ordering
ordinarily will not be efficacious to parties who will always use informal enforcement
due to the prohibitive cost of judicial action. See Macaulay, supra note 38, at 55, 62.
106. WILLIAMSON, MECHANISMS, supra note 34, at 12 (“Transactions, which differ in their
attributes, are aligned with governance structures, which differ in their cost and competence,
so as to effect a discriminating—mainly a transaction cost-economizing—result.”).
107. Jennejohn, supra note 10, at 282.
108. Id. at 314.
109. The discriminating alignment thesis allows companies to “minimize
transaction costs and maximize surplus” by choosing the governance structure that will
control contractual hazards in the most efficacious and least costly way. See Kostritsky,
supra note 26, at 481 (citing WILLIAMSON, CAPITALISM, supra note 28, at 72–79, 90–95).
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equivalent to the right to exclude?110 Having property rights depend
on informal enforcement would lead to higher costs for the parties and
might diminish incentives to invest, thereby making veto rights the
most effective tool for achieving the parties’ goals. With shirking and
shading and other forms of opportunism, perhaps information
transfer mechanisms can curb such behavior at a low cost and
therefore might be the preferred means of curbing proclivities to
produce substandard goods. The discriminating alignment theory
helps rationalize why parties might rely on protocols to promote
informal enforcement and, in other cases, adopt veto rights.
The real question for any analysis of the supply chain is how the
particular arrangements, adopted by the parties, function to solve the
problems of uncertainty and opportunism endemic in all exchange
relations, and most particularly, when large sunk costs are involved.
Thus, in evaluating these LTA frameworks, and looking at alternatives
to LTAs, one must examine how effective they are in solving
opportunism, promoting innovation, and resolving any other problems
that the parties face. How do these arrangements achieve parties’ goals
of getting high-quality goods to the buyer while generating fewer
benefits from cheating/shading in a cost-effective manner?
Solving problems like opportunism is complicated due to three
major contracting constraints that parties may face. First, bounded
rationality characterizes the human condition,111 and it limits the
ability to foresee future events and to predict future human behavior,
making it difficult to solve problems by a completely contingent
contract.112 Second, if there are large sunk costs or asset-specific
investments,113 the parties may not simply exit the market since they
110. See Jennejohn, supra note 10, at 324 (noting that certain contract provisions
can help a party avoid the risk that the counterparty will exploit jointly-owned IP).
111. See WILLIAMSON, CAPITALISM, supra note 28, at 45 (quoting HERBERT A. SIMON,
ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR: A STUDY OF DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES IN ADMINISTRATIVE
ORGANIZATION xxviii (3d ed. 1976)) (noting that economic actors are assumed to be
“intendedly rational, but only limitedly so”).
112. See id. at 67 (discussing “difficult contracting issues” where there is a
confluence of bounded rationality and sunk costs).
113. Sunk costs refer to “investments in durable, transaction-specific assets.” Id. at
53. Williamson points out that “such investments are also risky, in that specialized
assets cannot be redeployed without sacrifice of productive value if contracts should
be interrupted or prematurely terminated.” Id. at 54. When asset specificity combines
with uncertainty and opportunism, contracting difficulties arise, making governance
structures important to control “the strategic hazards that arise as a consequence of
their nonsalvageable character.” Id.
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will lose their investment.114 Finally, parties have propensities to act
opportunistically,115 and if they are unable to control that risk directly
by contract, parties will likely turn to other private strategies to
accomplish their goals.
In analyzing the role of framework contracts and why they take the
particular form that they do today, one must first address the
contracting obstacles that parties face in any exchange relation,
including the supply chain framework.
First, suppliers and buyers face many types of uncertainty. In some
cases, there will be uncertainty about the actual product that will be
produced or purchased,116 or there will be uncertainty about the
quantity that will be demanded or purchased.117 Gilson, Sabel, and
Scott see the problem that arises with contractual innovation as
presenting unique challenges due to uncertainty known as “continuous
uncertain change.”118 When presented in a heterogeneous market,
informal relational contracting may be difficult to achieve.119
Complete contingent contracting will be impossible due to uncertainty
about the end product.120 That uncertainty may even interfere with an
alternative way of organizing production—modularity121—due to the
inability to specify “the relevant interfaces.”122 Those impediments can
be solved by contractual provisions that promote information sharing,
which reduces uncertainty about the other party and its product.
Uncertainty would also be present where the buyer anticipates that the
supplier will make incremental improvements to the product. Under
these circumstances, the uncertainties may make it difficult to describe
the product with sufficient certainty for contractual enforcement.
114. See id. (discussing risk of contracts with sunk costs being “prematurely terminated”).
115. See id. at 47 (explaining that parties act opportunistically both overtly and subtly).
116. See Gilson et al., Contracting for Innovation, supra note 35, at 435 (highlighting
the inherent uncertainty of developing a new product).
117. Uncertainty about the quantity needed may cause parties to leave the quantity
open in an LTA.
118. Id.; Gilson et al., Contracting for Innovation, supra note 35, at 449.
119. This is because relational contracts ground by “tit-for-tat” enforcement may
not work when there are no continuing relations. See Gilson et al., Braiding, supra note
4, at 1395, 1395 n.47.
120. See id. at 1382 n.9 (explaining why there is a great amount of uncertainty about
end products in innovative industries).
121. Modularization is “a process driven by rapid product change and characterized
by the deconstruction of product design into discrete subsystems or functional
modules.” Herrigel, supra note 103, at 47.
122. Gilson et al., Contracting for Innovation, supra note 35, at 448.
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A. Other Uncertainties: Asymmetric Information and
Opportunism by Suppliers
Even if there is great uncertainty about the product being developed
that can be ameliorated by iterative cooperative investments that may
be achieved by formal sharing protocols, any analyst of organizational
or contractual choices must address certain overall risks of opportunism
that can mar the success of iterative cooperative exchanges.
There are two kinds of opportunism that a buyer may encounter.
One is that the supplier will not be forthcoming about what type of a
supplier it is, in which case the supplier has superior information and
has a disincentive to share that information with the buyer. This is the
problem of asymmetric information or adverse selection, which are
terms also used to describe insureds who know more about their
riskiness than the insurer does.123
Buyers also face uncertainty about how a supplier will act over the
course of the relationship. Economists call this “behavioral uncertainty.”124
Will the supplier produce high quality goods with a low defect rate that
meets the customer’s (buyer’s) standards, or will the supplier shirk and
produce poor quality goods?125 Will the supplier produce goods
meeting the buyer’s excellence standards as they are set forth in a quality
manual? Will a biotech company invest sufficient resources and effort
to maximize the chances of success? Some of the information sharing
protocols shift some aspects of judging goods into standards set by the
buyer. This risk of shading and shirking is the same risk of moral
hazard126 that a principal experiences when hiring an agent: Will the
123. WILLIAMSON, CAPITALISM, supra note 28, at 47 (discussing adverse selection as a
particular species of opportunism characterized by “the unwillingness of poor risks
candidly to disclose their true risk condition”).
124. Id. at 58–59.
125. Buyers also face uncertainty about the nature of the demand for their product,
which can fluctuate over a long period of time. See Gilson et al., Contracting for Innovation,
supra note 35, at 464 (explaining that the importance of the ability to respond to shifts
in demand and how Apple addresses demand fluctuations in its contract). Solutions to
that uncertainty problem may take the form of open-ended quantity terms.
126. Moral hazard is a type of opportunistic behavior. In the context of insurance, it
refers to the failure of insured persons “to behave in a fully responsible way and take
appropriate risk-mitigating actions” once covered under an insurance policy. See
WILLIAMSON, CAPITALISM, supra note 28, at 47. Moral hazard problems also arise in the
principal-agent context; the principal cannot directly observe the agent’s actions, and
the agent cannot discern whether the poor outcomes are due to lack of effort or to
exogenous events. See David E.M. Sappington, Incentives in Principal-Agent Relationships,
5 J. ECON. PERSP. 45, 46, 49–50 (1991) (“[T]he principal can’t observe . . . the level of
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agent shirk and not exert the effort that the principal would like? It is a
type of cost that inheres in all exchanges. Controlling that risk creates
value, and the devices for achieving good quality will be adopted if the
costs of adopting them are less than the costs from non-adoption.
The risk of the buyer receiving poor quality goods is also a
longstanding problem,127 but it may be particularly troublesome for
the modern buyer. A buyer or assembler today is under great pressure
to meet just-in-time production128 and to achieve “continuous
improvement”129 during its own production. As such, legal remedies
such as rejecting goods manufactured by a supplier, asking for a cure,
and suing the supplier/manufacturer in court if the cure is not
effectuated may be too costly and therefore unsatisfactory as a remedy.
However, all buyers—even buyers who predate the modern
deverticalized production economy—face the same problem of
unsatisfactory legal remedies for shading or other forms of
opportunism by suppliers. Buyers are incentivized to take various
actions before and during contracting with a supplier to reduce
uncertainty about competence and reliability including investigating
suppliers before contracting, requiring suppliers to prequalify,
continuously interacting with suppliers, requiring suppliers to meet
ongoing quality metrics through warranties in the purchase order.130
The goal of quality goods can be achieved without the benefit of formal
information sharing protocols or other provisions in an LTA requiring
monitoring of the supplier’s processes.
B. Opportunism by Buyers
Suppliers face parallel problems of uncertainty and opportunism by
the buyer. Suppliers risk investing significant sunk costs in tooling or
effort exerted by the agent.”); see also Kenneth J. Arrow, The Economics of Agency, in
PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 37, 37 (John W. Pratt & Richard
J. Zeckhauser eds., 1985) (noting that “principal[s] cannot observe the actions
themselves but may make some observations, for example, of the output”).
127. See Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts, supra note 7, at 572 (highlighting that
OEMS go to great lengths to ensure suppliers meet quality standards); see also Tang &
Zimmerman, supra note 88, at 79, 81 (examining the risks to Boeing in relying on
outside suppliers to produce the 787 airplane that is comprised of “unproven
technologies”).
128. WHITFORD, supra note 2, at 17–18 (discussing changes from just-in-time production).
129. Helper et al., Pragmatic Collaborations, supra note 22, at 469 n.39 (discussing the
questioning of routine as a source of continuous improvement).
130. See, e.g., DEERE & CO., PURCHASE ORDER, supra note 53, at 2.
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capital equipment for the buyer, the cost of which can only be
recouped by amortizing the cost over a long-term supply arrangement
and then being terminated. They also face the risk that the buyer will
falsely claim that the products are defective. The supplier also faces
other types of opportunism if the sharing of information results in the
buyer sharing it with the supplier’s competitors or using the
information to manufacture the item in-house. A buyer may also
opportunistically expropriate information intended for joint benefits
to both parties for its private benefit.131
C. Entropy: Coordination
Parties face other problems in collaborative innovation networks,
such as the risk of entropy that Jennejohn has identified. He defines
entropy to “mean that resources must be spent to synchronize efforts
and learning processes among team members.”132 The problems of
communication can become particularly difficult when expertise
necessitates developing “a shared language . . . among team members.”133
When team members are separate, they face challenges of learning
from the other party and “concurrency,” a situation in which there may
be a failure to align with the counterparty.134 Concurrency can occur
when the parties are “out of step” with one another because they lack
sufficient communication or coordination.135
Because entropy is a risk that can be distinguished from the
opportunism described earlier, it makes sense to focus on different
responses such as methodologies to routinize coordination136 or
through regular conversations137 to discuss problems. Parties might
adopt modularity as a different strategy to the entropy risk. The latter
technique avoids problems of coordination by actually lessening the
need for interacting with the other party.138 With modular design, the

131. Helper et al., Pragmatic Collaborations, supra note 22, at 444.
132. Jennejohn, supra note 10, at 314.
133. Id. at 315.
134. Id. at 320.
135. Id.
136. Helper et al., Pragmatic Collaborations, supra note 22, at 462–63 (discussing
benefits of routinization).
137. Id. at 474 (discussing the tendency of “super suppliers” to be “engaged in
discussion with their customers, with whom they speak by phone on average daily,
three times as often as the other suppliers in the sample”).
138. See WHITFORD, supra note 2, at 37.
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idea is that each partner is a distinct module that requires only a
“standardize[d]” connection.139
Jennejohn classifies entropy as a distinct problem, but entropy is like
any other friction in a relationship. If entropy is uncontrolled, it will
lead to a loss in surplus.140 Parties have to expend some resources to
coordinate production and may adopt preplanned routines to reduce
entropy. However, if the routines do not work, there will be a
breakdown, which could lead to significant costs that reduce surplus.
As Williamson explains: “[e]ffective adaptation was what distinguished
successful cooperative systems from failures.”141 The fundamental
question remains why and when parties will opt for certain
mechanisms in certain types of documents, and why they will opt for
different mechanisms in different settings. The bargaining lens and
cost minimization clarify these choices.
Promoting cooperation, facilitating the transfer of tacit
knowledge,142 and designing a structure for smoothly coordinating
interactions between parties will lower the transaction costs between
the parties. This Article discusses techniques which are designed to
anticipate and respond to problems that arise in the course of
coordination during contractual exchange.143
However, in many instances when the coordination breaks down, it
is a manifestation of the opportunism or shirking the problem. In
some ways, the breakdown is likely to occur when one party is not
investing enough in the relationship. An analogy can be made to the
employment situation by “distinguishing between consummate and
perfunctory cooperation.”144 If an employee underinvests in effort,
perhaps because the employee has been “‘forced’ to accept inferior
terms, [he] can adjust quality to the disadvantage of a predatory

139. Gilson et al., Contracting for Innovation, supra note 35, at 444 (discussing how
standardization contributes to a streamlined production by isolating distinct modules
from one another).
140. See WILLIAMSON, MECHANISMS, supra note 34, at 18.
141. WILLIAMSON, CAPITALISM, supra note 28, at 5.
142. Helper et al., Pragmatic Collaborations, supra note 22, at 464 n.35 (“Yet arm’s
length market relationships rarely provide fertile ground for the pooling of
perspectives (or, put differently, for the process of making tacit knowledge explicit and
shareable) that we identify as critical to pragmatic collaborations.”).
143. See infra note 213 and accompanying text.
144. WILLIAMSON, CAPITALISM, supra note 28, at 262.
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employer.”145 The employee is performing under an incomplete
contract and has the discretion to withhold high quality performance.
A similar type of withholding of high quality investment, and the
close relationship between entropy and opportunism, can arise in cases
where a buyer faced with managing a complex project, such as the
Boeing 787 “Dreamliner,” significantly underinvests in the
mechanisms that will facilitate coordination. Failure of the buyer to
invest in the relationship is an example of a buyer’s “perfunctory”
commitment to cooperation and ex-ante poses a significant problem
for any putative supplier entering the relationship. This type of
opportunism will be difficult to control by contract.
The interaction between coordination or entropy and opportunism
can be seen in other ways. For example, buyers may institute
mechanisms to smooth coordination by requiring the transfer of
information.
However, the mechanism designed to transfer
knowledge or deal with a “learning curve” differential146 between the
parties may also present a potential for opportunism by the buyer. A
buyer may decide to appropriate the supplier’s knowledge shared by
the supplier to bring the production in-house, leaving the supplier out
in the cold.147 So, a device that is intended to smooth coordination
also has the potential to pose an opportunism risk for a supplier.
Since entropy is a type of friction which, if uncontrolled, has the
potential to reduce the gains for trade, this Article will treat it like
opportunism or any transaction cost or hazard of contracting. In all
instances, the parties will seek to design contractual or other
organizational devices to reduce the friction. If not sufficiently
controlled, the party facing the risk will react by withdrawing or hedging,
or failing to cooperate.148
IV. LEGAL ENFORCEABILITY: ARE LTAS ENFORCEABLE, AND IF NOT,
WHY WOULD PARTIES EVER ENTER INTO THEM?
Before addressing how the LTAs respond to the uncertainties and
opportunism outlined above in Part III, this Article must first confront
the question of whether LTAs are legally enforceable agreements. A
145. Id.
146. Jennejohn, supra note 10, at 319.
147. WHITFORD, supra note 2, at 105 (noting tendencies “to see new managers pull
the most profitable back jobs in-house”).
148. See id. at 99 (describing how “steadily improving collaboration” is negatively
impacted by hedging).
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second question is whether the LTAs need to be legally enforceable to
address the asymmetric information and varieties of opportunism and
other contractual risks, or if there are provisions that can ameliorate
those problems without the need for enforceable legal LTA
obligations. The third question is why parties would ever enter these
agreements if they were legally unenforceable.
Generally, there is no one answer on the legal enforceability of
LTAs, as the particular document will determine its enforceability. If
the LTA does not contain a quantity term, and it is not a requirements
contract, the general view is that the agreement is unenforceable.149
Specifically, the LTA would lack the critical quantity requirement
necessary for a sale of goods transaction to be enforceable under the
UCC.150 Until the first purchase order is made, there is a risk that the
buyer could refuse to make any purchases under the agreement, and
the supplier would remain vulnerable to that risk. However, once the
first purchase order is made, there is a quantity and the purchase
orders may incorporate the LTA by reference.151
So, parties may first enter an LTA and subsequently exchange a
quote, a purchase order, and an acknowledgement. There is an
interweaving of provisions that will apply to a particular sale executed
under a purchase order, which is legally enforceable since it will
contain a quantity term. These provisions in the LTA may be
incorporated by reference into the purchase order, for example, and
may include information sharing protocols important for informal
enforcement, limited buyer purchase obligations going forward, and

149. See Sarah Rathke, Supply Chain Legal Reality: Why the UCC Is Sometimes the Worst,
Part I (Or, Who Wrote This Thing Anyway) (Or, Traps for the Unwary), SQUIRE PATTON
BOGGS: GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAIN L. BLOG (Jan. 26, 2015), https://www.globalsupplychain
lawblog.com/legal-analysis/supply-chain-legal-reality-why-the-ucc-is-sometimes-the-wo
rst-part-i-or-who-wrote-this-thing-anyway-or-traps-for-the-unwary (discussing how “idiosyncratic”
UCC provisions, such as the requirement of a “quantity term” in writing, conflict with supply
chain parties’ contracting needs).
150. The UCC has liberalized the requirements for definiteness in contract
formation. U.C.C. § 2-204(3) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017) (“Even
though one or more terms are left open a contract for sale does not fail for
indefiniteness if the parties have intended to make a contract and there is a reasonably
certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy.”) (emphasis added). However, the
absence of a quantity term makes many LTAs unenforceable.
151. See, e.g., Kraft Foods Group., Inc., Mondelēz Global LLC, Master Supply
Agreement § 11.5 (Sept. 27, 2012), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/15
45158/000119312512412668/d418360dex109.htm [hereinafter Kraft Foods MSA].
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terms such as a damage cap, indemnity provisions, and warranty
limitations or disclaimers.
Yet, even when the buyer has issued purchase orders, the buyer’s
obligation going forward in an LTA may be unenforceable. In some
LTAs, the buyer may only commit to provide forecasts to the supplier152
and may specifically disclaim any obligation to purchase goods made
by the supplier.153 There may be provisions that make the future
purchase obligations illusory or qualified, at least until a release or
purchase order is issued. In other instances, the buyer’s obligation will
not be illusory but, rather, it will be conditioned on the supplier’s
meeting certain standards of quality and price competitiveness154 and
continuing to agree to annual price reductions. Since those decisions
must be made in good faith, the buyer’s obligation could be a real
commitment to buy, albeit one conditioned on meeting certain
standards imposed by the buyer.
Certain contract innovation scholarship focuses on how formal
information sharing mechanisms facilitate informal enforcement. It
ties the increased importance of informal enforcement to the legal
unenforceability of LTAs because these agreements might not obligate
the buyer to buy anything.155 However, master agreements in the past
often operated without a quantity requirement.156 Without a quantity
term, the agreements were initially unenforceable, at least until the
first purchase order made the agreement legally enforceable at least
initially.157 In today’s LTAs, the new element is the formal information

152. See Manufacturer Interview, supra note 94; see also Bernstein, Beyond Relational
Contracts, supra note 7, at 593 (noting buyer’s “duty to provide non-binding rolling
forecasts on a monthly or quarterly basis”) (emphasis added).
153. See, e.g., Section 2.1(c) of Pfizer, Inc., Zoetis, Inc., Master Manufacturing and
Supply Agreement § 2.1(c) (Oct. 1, 2012), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/da
ta/1555280/000119312512420207/d381653dex1014.htm.
154. Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts, supra note 7, at 567 (quoting an
unidentified MSA) (discussing competition clauses that “provide [] if ‘a particular
part . . . is not a competitive value’” the supplier must take action).
155. See id. at 562.
156. IAN AYRES & GREGORY KLASS, STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW 150 (9th ed. 2017)
(“Frequently, parties do business for an extended period of time under an
arrangement where . . . neither party makes a promise to the other. Here there is no
contract until one party offers to sell or to buy and the other accepts the proposal.”).
157. See U.C.C. § 2-201 cmt. 1 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017); see also Crown
Battery Mfg. Co. v. Club Car, Inc., No. 3:12CV2158, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18907, at *12–13
(N.D. Ohio Feb. 14, 2014) (explaining that MSAs are not necessarily requirements contracts
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sharing protocols. These formal provisions may or may not be legally
enforceable. If the supplier promises information, but the buyer does
not provide a return promise to do anything, the promise to provide
the information may not be enforceable. In this case, enforcement
would therefore rely primarily on informal enforcement. However,
even if the agreement had a quantity or the purchase order
incorporated in the terms of the LTA—and they were therefore legally
enforceable—the main enforcement mechanism would remain
informal because legal remedies are so costly.
Resorting to informal enforcement as the primary device for
securing quality in the sale of goods has not changed radically over
time. In the past, information sharing or acquisition might have
occurred informally rather than being the subject of a formal
contractual agreement. Typically, buyers would enter agreements and
rely on a supplier’s reputation or have the supplier pre-qualify before
bidding. Yet, there were not as many formal provisions for suppliers
sharing that information on a continuing basis.
Today, although many provisions for information sharing, audits, or
inspections at supplier’s plants are now orchestrated in a formal
document, the provisions remain largely self-enforcing. If the buyer is
dissatisfied with quality, it may refuse to buy; however, because the
provision on quality is tied to the buyer’s own metrics of excellence, a
supplier would have difficulty suing a buyer for refusing to take its
products. Instead, the supplier would resort to self-help rather than
the judicial system. The suppler would be incentivized to correct any
quality issues that would risk a loss of future business. In older
agreements, even without as many formal sharing information
protocols, the consequences of displeasing the buyer were the same—
the loss of business or a reputational sanction.
There are two answers to the question of why parties might enter
unenforceable agreements. These answers tie back to the bargaining
lens in which parties understand the function the contract must
perform to achieve their individual interests, and then weigh whether
the benefits of achieving their goals through a particular form of
contract outweigh the costs.

when they do not establish a specified sale; rather, MSAs establish terms for future purchase
orders and “each purchase order forms a separate and distinct sales contract”).
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First, when the future purchase order is made, the LTA becomes
enforceable at least with respect to the actual product purchased.158
What may be most important to the supplier is not the continuing
obligation to buy or provisions regarding quality because these are likely
to be enforced informally. Rather, the supplier my prioritize provisions
in the LTA that will become enforceable as soon as a product is purchased
pursuant to the LTA. These could include provisions that limit damages
with a capped amount, eliminate consequential damages, or limit
warranties or indemnify the supplier against improper use of the product
by the buyer that could result in large damages.159
Second, these arrangements offer suppliers with large sunk costs the
security of a long-term formal arrangement. Suppliers with large asset
specific investments need to recoup or amortize their investment costs
over several years. These arrangements are standard between OEMs
and automotive suppliers. Sometimes these contracts incorporate an
“out” that allows the buyer to terminate for convenience or when the
products do not meet the buyer’s standards for excellence.
The bargaining lens applies here; even with those limitations on the
buyer’s purchase obligations, LTAs offer important security to
suppliers.160 When the purchase obligation is qualified, the supplier
can plan ahead, knowing that if it keeps its products to a level of
excellence or remains price competitive, the buyer will likely buy its
products, meaning that the LTA yields benefits that more than offset
the costs. The LTA, even if it is unenforceable, will offer security by
cementing a relationship with a customer.161 Further, the buyer will
have a hard time arguing that it is not obligated to buy if the outlined
conditions for purchasing are met. The supplier can control that
hazard by monitoring the behavior of its agents and employees and by
maintaining a competitive price. Implicit trust may build up and may
constrain the buyer from terminating.

158. The purchase order may incorporate the LTA provisions and those provisions
would then apply to the product purchased pursuant to a purchase order.
159. Examples include products like an airplane or medical device, as the damages
in such cases can be extraordinary.
160. See Interview with Susan Helper, Frank Tracy Carlson Professor of Econ., Case.
W. Res. U. Weatherhead School of Mgmt. (Feb. 21, 2017) [hereinafter Helper
Interview]; see also Helper et al., Pragmatic Collaborations, supra note 22, at 476 (discussing
the example of Honda and Donnelly, Donnelly’s subsequent expansion into side mirrors
and mutual benefit for both firms after rear view mirror contract terminated).
161. $2 Billion Manufacturer Interview, supra note 51.
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Alternatively, the implicit trust may mean that if the buyer does
terminate for reasons beyond its control, it may offer the supplier
another job even though it is not mandated by the contract.162
Additionally, even if an OEM with an LTA is not legally obligated to do
so, it may decide to finance some improvement.163 Suppliers may be
encouraged to invest given the implicit contracting relationship
created by the LTA. All of these benefits suggest that the cost of
negotiating an LTA might be outweighed by the benefits of a secure
commitment (although legally unenforceable) and other benefits
such as cementing a relationship.
Third, the supplier may have no choice but to agree since many large
OEMs or other large global buyers dictate that suppliers submit to
LTAs. Finally, since the parties rarely expect to resort to legal
enforcement regardless of whether an LTA or a less detailed purchase
order is entered into, the question will resolve into whether the higher
transaction costs, including lawyer time, are justified by the benefits
that can be achieved by laying out the obligations of the supplier in a
systematic fashion in an LTA. What are the offsetting benefits to
suppliers? They include increased security of the commitment and
increased probability of recouping large sunk costs.
V. ADVANTAGES OFFERED BY LTAS: FOUNDATIONAL MECHANISMS FOR
INFORMAL ENFORCEMENT AND SOLVING UNCERTAINTIES
A. Controlling Contractual Hazards Under Conditions of Uncertainty
1. Reducing uncertainties given limits on contracting and promoting low cost
informal enforcement
The design of the LTAs responds to the durable problems in all
exchanges—uncertainty, bounded rationality, sunk costs and
opportunism. LTAs help solve these problems of exchange but only
“indirectly.”164 The provisions on information sharing do not function
to set up a possible breach of a performance obligation for purpose of

162. See Helper Interview, supra note 160.
163. See id. (discussing Honda and Donnelly).
164. Jennejohn, supra note 10, at 293 (explaining the view of Gilson that the “formal
contracts only indirectly govern collaborations by fostering informal constraints on
opportunism”).
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initiating a lawsuit,165 but rather to facilitate informal enforcement.166
The information sharing mechanisms in LTAs constitute the formal
provisions in the agreement, and they provide the information that is
useful in administering informal sanctions against the other party.
Gilson, Sabel, and Scott label this as “braiding”167 to describe the
combination of formal terms and informal enforcement.
In evaluating LTAs, scholars of contracts for innovation have
demonstrated the ways that new information sharing devices can
achieve advantages for the parties that cannot be achieved by a formal
contract with a rigid performance obligation. For example, a complete
contract would not be feasible in innovation contexts because the
contours of the performance obligation are undetermined at the start
of the contract. Where heightened uncertainty about the project’s
contours makes it difficult “to observe whether particular actions are
cooperative or not, and also hard for courts to determine ex post what
counts as a good outcome,”168 information protocols committing both
parties to invest encourages continued cooperation and results in a
“braiding” of formal and informal enforcement.169
There is a spectrum of differences in the level of uncertainty
affecting the sale of goods. In some cases, there is extreme uncertainty
about the final product with collaborative innovation. Sometimes,
there is less, but still very real, uncertainty when the supplier is
incrementally improving the products it sells.170 Other times, there is
no uncertainty about the product, but still uncertainty about the
quality of the good that will be delivered.

165. See Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts, supra note 7, at 562 (describing the
agreement’s structure as merely a tool to detail how business will be conducted and
not to set up breach parameters).
166. See Jennejohn, supra note 10, at 282 (noting that the information protocols do
not “determin[e] performance obligations”); see also Hadfield & Bozovic, supra note 2,
at 988 (suggesting that formal provisions in contracts help to determine if there is a
performance breach, which is then informally sanctioned). Even when the product
was known and agreement drafted, parties rarely sued over an alleged breach of a
performance obligation so the uncertainty over the final product may not have
changed the likelihood or ability to invoke a legal remedy.
167. See Gilson et al., Braiding, supra note 4, at 1383.
168. Id. at 1386 (discussing uncertainty over “good outcome” when the product or
project is a work in progress as the standards are evolving with the product).
169. Id. at 1383.
170. Gilson et al., Braiding, supra note 4, at 1385 (discussing incremental product
improvement).
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Do the heightened uncertainties in collaborative innovation
ventures mean that the information sharing protocols will solve those
problems more efficiently than other mechanisms and maximize
surplus? Are there other factors in the innovation context that make
adoption of such protocols important for achieving the parties’ joint
interests, such as a need for a planning document to govern a highly
complex project? Are the uncertainties regarding the nature of the
product any different from other uncertainties that generally afflict the
supply chain such as behavioral uncertainty about the potential for
shirking?171 In both cases, uncertainty about a product being
developed or uncertainty about future quality of the product will result
in an incomplete contract. Whether the parties use an LTA or some
other agreement, such as a purchase order, and what type they adopt
is a deliberate choice. That choice will likely depend on the bargaining
in which parties consider their individual interests and determine
whether the benefits of achieving those goals through an LTA or
another form will minimize transaction costs (frictions), while serving
other needs such as centralization and planning.
Is the choice related to concerns that LTAs with information sharing
protocols themselves pose risks or costs? What are those risks or costs?
Scholars argue that the iterative sharing of information through
information sharing protocols offers parties a way to determine what
the ultimate product will be and thus overcomes one type of uncertainty:
uncertainty about the ultimate product. In deciding why a particular
arrangement is used, it is useful to consider other situations in the supply
chain where the parties know what product they are supplying but face
other key uncertainties of opportunism and shirking.
When those uncertainties exist, the parties can achieve reductions
in uncertainty from iterative steps without an LTA with formal
information sharing protocols?
There other ways to reduce
uncertainties about reliability and competence that do not involve
being in a close-knit relational contract with preexisting trust. Trust
can be endogenized by these iterative steps between parties, even if
parties forego using an LTA with a formal information mechanism,
perhaps by being part of a network. Certainly, interim steps can be
taken and the way the other party reacts can help to reduce uncertainty
about the other party. Further, if the parties have access to a network,

171. E.g., WILLIAMSON, CAPITALISM, supra note 28, at 57 (stating that “[b]ehavioral
uncertainty is of special importance to an understanding of transaction cost economics”).
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they could engage in tit-for-tat responses to another party’s action,
even when there is no long-term relationship.
The information sharing devices in LTAs are particularly useful in
heterogeneous supply chains where parties may lack a close
relationship that would provide a source of information, facilitate
informal enforcement, and overcome uncertainties.172 Instead of trust
already existing and forming the basis of a relationship (exogenously),
the parties do not need to have “preexisting” trust with LTAs.173 The
collaborative information sharing mechanisms allow them to “establish
a deeply collaborative relation[] where little or none existed before.”174
It would be difficult to overcome the uncertainties by contract since
provisions promising to be a reliable supplier or to not shirk or one to
promise to be excellent would be too vague to enforce.175
In the collaboration on a new product context, there is uncertainty
about the ultimate product. Thus, contracting on the end product is
impossible. However, to ensure that parties invest in a reciprocal way,
they formally agree to make investments in either research or funding,176
and they may also agree to abide by rules requiring unanimity in
committees.177 These mechanisms encourage cooperation, discourage
misunderstandings,178 and protect incentives to invest since “blatant”
refusals to invest will be punished.179

172. Jennejohn, supra note 10, at 296 (“Those formal mechanisms combine to foster
informal constraints that otherwise may not occur in the dynamic heterogeneous markets
in which much collaboration occurs in the modern economy.”).
173. Gilson et al., Braiding, supra note 4, at 1403–05.
174. Id. at 1404.
175. See WILLIAMSON, CAPITALISM, supra note 28, at 67 (suggesting such “general
clause contracting” is problematic where opportunism is present).
176. Gilson et al., Braiding, supra note 4, at 1422.
177. Id. at 1403 (identifying the main advantages of these unanimity rules as they
will ensure parties get needed information and a skeptic will be able to force disclosure
because without it the other party will not get the consent it needs to proceed. It also
“discourages obstinacy” because high level personnel to whom the dispute will be
referred will not want their time wasted).
178. Gilson et al., Contracting for Innovation, supra note 35, at 480–81 (“A referee can
clarify misunderstandings early, avoiding false negatives—i.e., the interpretation of the
other’s behavior as a defection. When she finds that a defection has indeed occurred,
a referee can, by ‘blowing the whistle’ while providing for a fast and low-cost resolution
to the dispute, forestall disproportionate responses by the aggrieved party . . . . The
referee also serves as an informal disciplining mechanism . . . . The subordinates’ job
is to resolve problems, not escalate them.”).
179. Gilson et al., Braiding, supra note 4, at 1409.
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By increasing transparency, the LTAs can help to deter cheating and other
forms of opportunism such as shirking, a different kind of uncertainty known
as behavioral uncertainty.180 LTAs help to overcome the problem of
asymmetric information between the buyer and supplier by offering the
supplier a way to signal its value to the buyer in the form of a credible
commitment. LTAs build up social capital181 and personal ties182 that offer
means of informal sanctioning for misbehaviors detected through the
information sharing. Of course, as Williamson points out, “[g]iven the very
real limitations, however, with which court ordering is beset,”183 “contractual
disputes and ambiguities are more often settled by private ordering.”184
LTAs also create a cost to both parties for exiting, called a “switching
cost,”185 thereby allowing parties to reap the advantages of mutual
investment. When both parties engage in reciprocal investments, the
risk of opportunism decreases.
The condition of mutual investment, rather than any legal
obligation, constrains opportunistic behavior by both parties because
they are locked into continuing their relationship since the switching
costs of arranging for an alternative supplier are too great to justify an
exit for a trivial deviation. Switching costs can occur even when the
parties are not parties to LTAs with information sharing protocols.
When a supplier furnishes goods to a buyer, switching costs can occur
when the supplier has to find another buyer, or the buyer has to find
another supplier. As such, switching costs in which a buyer has to
research alternate suppliers can occur even without a formal LTA.
Because many LTAs are legally unenforceable when they are signed
(due to the absence of a quantity term),186 the agreements may be
more important for the ways they facilitate interactions between the
parties and reduce uncertainties about how good the products
produced by the supplier will be or how competent one’s counterparty
is.187 However, even if the agreements were legally enforceable, damage
180. WILLIAMSON, CAPITALISM, supra note 28, at 57 (discussing behavioral uncertainty).
181. See Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts, supra note 7, at 563.
182. See id.
183. WILLIAMSON, CAPITALISM, supra note 28, at 21.
184. Id. at 10.
185. Gilson et al., Braiding, supra note 4, at 1383 n.10. (defining “switching costs—the
costs one party to a contract must incur in order to replace the other party to the contract”).
186. See generally JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§§ 4–9 (6th ed. 2010) (detailing need for quantity or in the absence of a specific
quantity, a requirements contract).
187. WHITFORD, supra note 2, at 98–99.
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claims for breaches of the protocols would be difficult due to the
contract doctrine requiring certainty in proving damages. Accordingly,
reliance on informal enforcement would likely be predominant.
Of course, the same uncertainties plague any supply chain for the
sale of goods and not all parties exchanging goods resort to LTAs with
information sharing protocols or unanimity rules. Why would that be
the case? In cases where there is no guarantee of repeat business, the
supplier has to work hard to earn the trust of the buyer who may not
know him initially. The supplier needs to demonstrate his competence
and commitment to quality and reliability where those matters are
unknown to the counterparty. Uncertainties about those matters can
be lowered by iterative steps taken by the supplier.
Even when there is certainty about the final product, the parties may
still encounter uncertainty. Specifically, there may be uncertainty
regarding whether the goods will be quality goods and timely
delivered, and whether the supplier is reliable. Iterative responses
during the supply contract can lower these uncertainties, even without
any formal requirement in an LTA to share information.
To assess why parties forego using LTAs with formal informational
sharing protocols and opt to use another arrangement to govern
supply chains instead, one must first assess the rationales offered for
the formal informational protocols. Later, it might be useful to assess
whether those rationales would also apply to non-LTAs.
The formal information sharing and iterative collaboration result in
reduced uncertainty about a party’s competence and reliability and in
parties mutually investing.188 For example, in the pharmaceutical
industry, a party—usually the funding party—has a unilateral right to
withdraw.189 So, while the parties do not yet know what will be
produced, they are required to share information. That requirement
incentivizes the research biotech industry to invest adequately in
research since without adequate investment the funding party will
withdraw. The information sharing mechanisms lend transparency to

188. Id.
189. Gilson et al., Contracting for Innovation, supra note 35, at 470.
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the investments, providing confidence that the process is “fair,”190 and
also leads to “iterat[ive], cooperative adjustments.”191
The iterative steps are taken in the context of a contract that has nested
options as well as provisions for how to handle disagreements. Due to
“nested options regulating the sequence and conditions under which the
parties can . . . commercialize the product”192 contractual options within an
arrangement-the party that functions as the research entity will not take
costly precautions to protect themselves. For example, the research entity
will not withhold information as their research yields more results, because
they will be protected once they are able to produce a successful product
from expropriation by the other party.193 Constraining opportunism can
be done in a number of ways. The right to withdraw and nested options
encourage the researching party to invest sufficiently in research,
transparency gives security to both parties, as well as dispute resolution
mechanisms which increase accuracy in determining whether the parties
have invested appropriately.194 These sharing protocols also deter “blatant”
abuses of shared information.195
In a supply chain where there is no major design collaboration and
the product is a standard good, other party’s reliability, shirking
potential, and competence are the major uncertainties. To reduce the
uncertainties about the counterparty, the parties could, but do not
always, require a transfer of information in a formal LTA. Instead, they
may rely on other means of constraining opportunism.
For example, the lock-in effect,196 which serves to deter parties from
switching to another supplier or buyer when the party has performed,
can occur even without the formally orchestrated exchange of
information in an LTA. As parties deliver goods, make adjustments,
and demonstrate their competence and reliability, they reduce
uncertainty about the competence and reliability of the counterparty
leading to a lock-in effect generated by the actions taken. In these
190. See Gilson et al., Braiding, supra note 4, at 1409 (explaining that the information
transmission is combined with governance mechanisms that may implement a contract
referee for disputes); see also id. at 1403 (explaining that because unanimity may be
required for actions, parties can easily request information from the other party to secure
their consent and “makes it easy for reasonable skeptics to require more information”).
191. Id. at 1408.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Gilson et al., Contracting for Innovation, supra note 35, at 491.
195. Gilson et al., Braiding, supra note 4, at 1384.
196. Gilson et al., Contracting for Innovation, supra note 35, at 480.
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settings—and even when they are not in a situation where repeated
dealings are contemplated—parties may still be constrained if the
information about their behavior will reach others in a network to
which both firms belong. The very process of dealing with each other
and gaining confidence in the other party about their ability to produce
quality goods has similar benefits of constraining opportunism and
locking in the parties without the need for formally shared information
protocols.197 Thus, adoption of such protocols cannot be explained solely
by the benefits of the lock-in effect. Moreover, the lock-in effect can also
be achieved by a different contractual arrangement that locks both parties
in with an upfront continuing commitment to purchase, as was the case
with the German and Japanese economies.198
Bernstein suggests another answer as to why information sharing
protocols exist. She explains that such arrangements “broaden[] the
self-enforcing range of contractual obligations” and “expand[] the
types of behavior that can be sanctioned.”199
Finally, Bernstein suggests that they “clear a space for other, extralegal
modes of contract governance.”200 These information sharing protocols

197. If a supplier terminated its relationship with a buyer, it would have to explain
to future buyers why it did so. Since future buyers would be wary of suppliers who
terminate relationships, suppliers would be hesitate to exit, leading to a lock-in effect.
A similar, parallel effect could constrain buyers.
198. Gilson et al., Braiding, supra note 4, at 1410–11 (discussing different governance
mechanisms that produce a lock-in effect in a different way than the information sharing
protocols do). Instead of gradually raising switching costs through increased trust and
confidence, the Japanese and German companies “first raise switching costs—in effect
prohibiting exit from the relationship—and then devising ways of sharing information to
work productively within the constraints they have imposed.” Id. at 1411.
199. Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts, supra note 7, at 563. Bernstein explains as
follows: “For example, suppose that a supplier refused to permit a buyer’s representative to
conduct an unannounced factory inspection or audit that was authorized by the MSA.” Id.
at 603. The “buyer would not have a credible threat to sue for damages,” id.; however, the
protocols offer the supplier a way of credibly committing to the buyer knowing that
breaches of the audit protocol will lead to informal sanctions.
For a discussion of credible commitments as a private device to lower uncertainties about the
other party, see WILLIAMSON, CAPITALISM, supra note 28, at 167 (defining credible
commitments as “tactics by which one party can realize an advantage in relation to a rival by
credibly ‘tying one’s hands’”). In the context of the supply chain, suppliers subscribing to
abide by information sharing mechanisms are in effect offering a type of hostage or bond that
distinguishes those willing to share such information from suppliers who refuse to do so.
200. Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts, supra note 7, at 562.
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also secure a higher price for the supplier than could otherwise be
obtained or secure a contract that it could not otherwise obtain.201
If iterative steps can be taken to lower uncertainties about shirking and
reliability, or if a supplier can resolve those uncertainties simply by agreeing
to a buyer’s terms and conditions not to sell any product that does not
conform to a buyer’s quality manual,202 informal governance can proceed
without LTAs, then why would some relationships benefit from the
additional formal provisions mandating information sharing? Why and
when would those additional formal provisions be worth the cost or would
there be offsetting benefits that would outweigh the costs of negotiation?203
There will always be space for informal governance even without the formal
information sharing protocols. Therefore, the real question is whether the
benefits in lowering uncertainties and building trust where there is no
preexisting trust outweigh the other costs of negotiating an LTA and the
potential costs of opportunistic exploitation of the information? The
answer to that question will vary with different contexts.
To understand why some parties use LTAs while others do not, consider
several cases. Consider also the bargaining lens with its focus on the parties’
individual interests and their desire to minimize transaction costs to
maximize surplus. One case involves the supply chain in the automotive
context, another setting involves a manufacturer of a standard product that
is fungible, and another involves the highly collaborative project on research.
In the automotive context, there are likely to be large asset specific
sunk costs. Such large sunk costs are also likely to be present in the
collaborative research context. However, these sunk costs would be
less likely where there are fungible goods. Differences in the degree
of sunk costs and asset-specific investments may explain the differential
use of LTAs.204 The need to protect those sunk costs may explain the

201. See WILLIAMSON, CAPITALISM, supra note 28, at 20 (stating that credible
commitments act as a kind of safeguard to “restore integrity to transactions”); see also
id. at 24 (depicting that transactions with safeguards are acting to minimize hazards
and will be priced accordingly).
202. See, e.g., DEERE & CO., PURCHASE ORDER, supra note 53, at 2.
203. See Gilson et al., Braiding, supra note 4, at 1414 (noting several disadvantages
of an approach to lock in a buyer by contract which obligates a buyer to continue
purchasing products or services). Among other things, the disadvantages included
increased shirking and a lessened ability to deal with disruptions and challenges, which
suggest reasons for why the incremental building of a lock in effect over time has
advantages over the lock in effect achieved by long-term commitments.
204. General Counsel Interview, supra note 20. Nineteen of the sixty-eight companies
surveyed indicated that they acquired capital equipment for a specific buyer in at least 67%
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willingness to take on the additional costs of an LTA, even with the
onerous terms that are often contained in such agreements. Where
large sunk costs are not present, and the goods can be resold to others,
the need for an LTA may be reduced—especially if other means of
assuring reliability exist.

of their dealings. Of these companies, thirty-two percent indicated that they use LTAs and
MSAs at least seventy-six percent of the time. All of the companies indicated that they use
LTAs or MSAs at least eleven percent of the time. Although the sample size is small, survey
results tend to indicate that manufacturers who incur significant costs to purchase capital
equipment are more likely than the average manufacturer to use an LTA.

PERCENTAGE OF LTA
USAGE BY
MANUFACTURERS
0% - 10%
11% - 25%
26% - 75%
76% - 100%
TOTALS

MANUFACTURERS WITH LTA/MSA USAGE
RESPONDENTS
RESPONDENTS
WITH HIGH
WITH LOW
CAPITAL COSTS
CAPITAL COSTS
0
21
6
7
6
19

7
11
4
43

ALL
RESPONDENTS
21
13
18
11
63*

* One manufacturer did not indicate their capital costs in the survey.

MANUFACUTURERS LTA/MSA USAGE
PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS

Respondents with Low Capital Costs
50%

Respondents with High Capital Costs

48%
37%

40%
32%
30%

32%
25%

16%

20%

11%
10%
0%
0%
0% - 10%

11% - 25%
26% - 75%
FREQUENCY OF LTA/MSA USE

76% - 100%

204. See Helper Interview, supra note 160 (discussing the Donnelly/Honda example).
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Additionally, where one party’s production is dependent on the
other party’s production, information sharing protocols may be
important in preventing problems early before they adversely impact
the buyer’s production. The information sharing protocols would
then provide added benefits that would outweigh the costs. Further,
when there are large, asymmetric sunk-cost investments, the presence
of information sharing protocols may lessen uncertainties and
encourage investment which might not otherwise occur if there were
no formal sharing of information to demonstrate the other party’s
willingness to collaborate.
B. Lowering Costs: Lowering the Cost from Shirking by Permitting Self-Help
The information provisions lower the costs from supplier shirking.
Because LTAs are structured to permit buyers to exercise a great deal
of self-help, they promote self-enforcement of matters involving the
quality of goods.205 First, if the goods do not meet the buyer’s
standards, the buyer can insist that the supplier send new goods
meeting those standards, and the supplier may need to assume
expedited shipping costs.206 Instead of rejecting goods that are
substandard207 and then suing the supplier, buyers are often not
obligated to buy goods that do not meet their standards.208 That helps
lower the costs that the buyer must shoulder for substandard goods.
Suppliers agreeing to such clauses may signal their commitment to
sending high quality products.
Of course, even in the absence of an LTA providing that the buyer
can reject a supplier’s substandard goods, parties often exercise selfhelp. If a buyer complains about a product, the supplier might simply
take the product back209 and rarely would anyone sue over a
performance obligation. So, self-help can occur without information
sharing protocols or LTA provisions on self-help being present.
The bargaining lens may help explain why a buyer and a seller’s joint
interest in minimizing transaction costs and maximizing value might
be served by an LTA self-help provision. The provision helps the buyer
avoid the cost of legal enforcement over substandard goods and
205. See Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts, supra note 7, at 607 (discussing the
connection between self-enforcement and network governance).
206. See, e.g., Sun Microsystems MSA, supra note 21, § 8.2.
207. U.C.C. § 2-601 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
208. See, e.g., Whirlpool Strategic Alliance Agreement § 6.3 (Mar. 15, 2002).
209. See General Counsel Interview, supra note 20.
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insures that it is only obligated to pay for conforming goods. The
supplier’s self-interest is in signaling that it is a high-quality supplier.
Whether the buyer agrees to that kind of term in an LTA will depend
on whether there are other benefits from agreeing to the LTA, such as
cementing a relationship with a buyer or securing a long-term
commitment that is either legally enforceable or comes with an
implicit expectation of other benefits from the buyer, should the buyer
terminate its purchases early.210
C. Overcoming Asymmetric Information: Credible Commitment
LTAs also act as a way for suppliers to offer a credible commitment
to their potential buyers.211 Buyers who might be reluctant to do
business with a supplier—because of uncertainties about their
competence or reliability—will agree to do business with suppliers who
sign LTAs. When searching for a long-term supplier, buyers often
require candidate suppliers to prequalify. In this situation, the buyer
will have more information about the supplier before the contract is
signed, which helps solve the problem of asymmetric information.
Some suppliers may also agree to participate in webinar training or
achieving excellence programs.212 Additionally, suppliers may opt to
disclose more information on a continuing basis.213 The supplier may
agree to give the buyer access to the supplier’s plant, perhaps with the
provision of a quality engineer on the premises. Suppliers could also
agree to give buyers access to cost information and audits. Because
suppliers have to furnish quality control reports, participate in quality
training programs,214 provide cost information, and agree to

210. See Helper Interview, supra note 160.
211. See supra note 199 (discussing credible commitments).
212. See Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts, supra note 7, at 581–83; Gilson et al.,
Contracting for Innovation, supra note 35, at 459–63 (discussing the John Deere
“Achieving Excellence” program); see also Deere & Co. & Stanadyne Corp., Long Term
Agreement § V (Nov. 1, 2001),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1053439/000119312507182449/dex1011
.htm (providing that Stanadyne Corp. will strive to meet or exceed the John Deere
“Achieving Excellence” requirements).
213. Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts, supra note 7, at 583 (discussing continuing
obligations to supply information through plant inspections and financial audits).
214. Id. at 579 n.62 (noting that John Deere LTAs require supplier participation in
training). Suppliers may also agree that if their products are below specified metrics,
the buyer is not obligated to buy.
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participate in mandates for root cause analysis215 for problem
detection,216 the buyer learns about the supplier’s competence and
reliability. This lowers the uncertainty about the counterparty as the
parties exchange goods with each other.
Suppliers agree to participate in part because by lowering uncertainty for
the buyer and signaling its willingness to share information, the supplier
earns a higher price for its goods. In a sense, the supplier’s agreement to
engage in information sharing constitutes a credible commitment,217 which
increases the price the buyers will pay. Presumably, without such information
agreements, the buyer might pay less because more uncertainties about the
supplier would remain unresolved.218
Even without an LTA with a formal information sharing device, the
supplier might undertake to signal its reliability and competence in other
ways. It could pre-qualify as a supplier219 and meet the specifications of the
buyer before bidding or warrant its compliance with a quality manual in the
purchase order. Suppliers could also agree to terms and conditions which
give the buyer a termination for convenience clause, agreement to which
would signal the supplier’s confidence in the quality of its goods.220 Under
the bargaining lens modeled here, suppliers will weigh the increased prices
paid for credible commitments in the form of information sharing against
possible costs such as buyer expropriation of shared information.
D. Other Benefits of LTAs: Improved Methods of Production
In this process of continuous improvement, the LTA may provide
for the pooling of information. This shared information leads to
parties becoming increasingly nimble at adopting new methods.221
215. Id. at 584 (citing James J. Rooney & Lee N. Vanden Heuvel Root Cause Analysis for
Beginners, 37 QUALITY PROGRESS 45, 45 (2004)) (“A rootcause analysis is ‘a tool designed to
help identify not only what and how an event occurred, but also why it happened.’”).
216. Helper et al., Pragmatic Collaborations, supra note 22, at 443, 466.
217. Gilson et al., Braiding, supra note 4, at 1438 (“It is this information sharing regime
that ‘braids’ the formal and informal elements of the contract and endogenizes trust.”).
218. See WILLIAMSON, CAPITALISM, supra note 28, at 174 (discussing the value of
credible commitments in reducing a hazard of an exchange and thereby increasing
the efficiency of the exchange).
219. Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts, supra note 7, at 596–97.
220. Termination for Convenience Under the Uniform Commercial Code, ABA COM. L. NEWSL.
(Matthew C. Brown et al., Chicago, Il.), Mar. 10, 2014, at 3, 4 (explaining that termination
for convenience clauses are “becoming increasingly popular in supply agreements”).
221. Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts, supra note 7, at 597 (“Relational capital
increases flexibility, enables the parties to rely on reciprocal informal adjustments being made
over time, and leads to the sharing of information that can greatly reduce production costs.”).
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The sharing of information reduces concerns about remaining
ignorant of the other and the greater transparency may lessen what
one author terms “incitements to trickery.”222 It may also be useful in
benchmarking and error detection techniques that permit the parties to
collaborate on improvements in efficiencies.223 Finally information
sharing also exposes the supplier to the culture of the buyer, and that
understanding gives the supplier an edge in becoming a better supplier.
E. Personal Ties Enhanced; Cost Reductions Originated
The LTA may also provide for personnel meetings, visits to the
supplier’s plant, or visits by supplier engineers to the buyer.224 The
buyer could mandate a quality engineer to inspect the supplier’s plant.
All of these formalized interactions facilitate trust and information
sharing, in part through the development of personal ties.225 The
supplier may also agree to, or be pressured to, accept targeted price
reductions of a certain percentage each year. One author suggests that
“[s]imple sharing rules may result”226 and under such rules the parties
could agree on how to share the “gains from innovations.”227
As with other benefits generated by LTA provisions that require or
encourage visits to the supplier or buyer plants, the question is whether
such ties could occur without being formally orchestrated.
Presumably, some could occur without being formally required. These
personal connections could occur because the parties are embedded

222. See Helper et al., Pragmatic Collaborations, supra note 22, at 471.
223. Id. at 466 (explaining that “the exchanges of information required to engage
in benchmarking, simultaneous engineering and error detection and correction also
allow the collaborators to monitor one another’s activities, closely enough to detect
performance failures and deception before they lead to disastrous consequences”); see
also Tang & Zimmerman, supra note 88, at 78 (discussing the case study of the diffuse
network that built the Boeing 787 “Dreamliner”).
As Boeing outsourced more, communication and coordination between Boeing
and its suppliers became critical for managing the progress of the 787
development program. To facilitate the coordination and collaboration among
suppliers and Boeing, Boeing implemented a web-based tool called Exostar that
is intended to gain supply chain visibility, improve control and integration of
critical business processes, and reduce development time and cost . . . .
Id.
224. Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts, supra note 7, at 593.
225. Id. at 592–94.
226. Helper et al., Pragmatic Collaborations, supra note 22, at 472.
227. Id. at 473.
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in a network.228 Parties constantly communicate information that results
in numerous benefits, including greater trust in veracity of the
information shared.229 In other cases, the parties can be autonomous
firms without formal information sharing protocols, but personal ties can
develop as the relationship continues. Alternatively, the parties may not
share close personal ties but may share ties to a network of buyers and
suppliers that share information, making personal ties unimportant. The
incentive to formally require inspections on an ongoing basis with the
resulting closer personal ties might be more likely when the buyer’s
investment is dependent on the success of the supplier. As the buyer
invests more in the joint project, it has more to lose if the supplier cannot
produce quality parts or fuselages in a timely fashion. Thus, as the parties
are locked into a bilateral relationship of mutual dependency, the
willingness and need to adopt provisions to control hazards is greater.
F. Preventing Problems from Arising;
Switching Costs Deterring Opportunism
These information mechanisms achieve major benefits one of which
is helping prevent problems from arising.230 Although the provisions
may be largely unenforceable, since it is hard to envision how the buyer
could sue for damages for failure to share information, they will help
the buyer identify problems early on and ensure that the buyer has a
continuous flow of information that will help it improve its products
and remain competitive.231 The protocols alert the supplier to the
kinds of information it needs to make available to its buyers and sets
up expectations for the personnel at the supplier. The “braiding” that
results from the multiple interactions may help to deter opportunism
by both buyer and supplier. The supplier would be deterred from
shirking because if it did, and it lost the supply contract, it would have
to explain to a new buyer why it exited a prior LTA. Similarly, if the
buyer needed to find a new supplier, it would have to explain to the new
supplier why it had terminated a prior supplier. It would have to assure

228. Brian Uzzi, Social Structure and Competition in Interfirm Networks: The Paradox of
Embeddedness, 42 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 35, 36 (1997). Embeddedness can take “four forms:
structural, cognitive, political, and cultural.” Id.
229. Id. at 46.
230. Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts, supra note 7, at 564 (noting “contract
administration mechanisms . . . create the conditions for producing goods to a buyer’s
specifications”).
231. Id.
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the new supplier that it had not acted opportunistically, or it might have
difficulty getting the new supplier to collaborate on a project.
Although few formal provisions burden buyers,232 once the parties
have solidified a relationship with each other that may include
information sharing, visits to the supplier’s plant, and even training
seminars to be held at the buyer’s facilities, there are informal forces
that will keep buyers from going to another supplier. Thus, the
benefits of this arrangement arise from a constraint of switching cost,
rather than a legal cost of breaching a term of the LTA.
Can these switching costs occur without formal information transfer
mechanisms? There are many ways to create switching costs without an
LTA. For example, a supplier could raise switching costs for a buyer by
making a unique part for a buyer. Similarly, if a supplier develops a fuel
pump for an airplane engine and the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) for the life of the airplane approves the fuel pump,233 then that
buyer will have infinite switching costs as the FAA would have to approve
a new fuel pump. Changing to a new fuel pump would not be possible
without violating the airplane manufacturer’s agreement with the FAA
to install only pre-approved parts. Switching costs can occur in any
relationship as a party provides the other party information about its
reliability and competence through its performance.
Gilson, Sabel, and Scott explain this phenomenon as one that occurs
“in markets where learning about the quality of potential substitute
suppliers and their products is time consuming and expensive, there can
be significant barriers—switching costs—to exiting a relationship.”234
Presumably, even without entering into an LTA with formal information
protocols, the knowledge gained about the counterparty’s abilities and
reliability will act as a deterrent to exit. If a buyer complains about a
product, and the supplier offers a concession in price without even
requiring that the defective products be returned,235 both parties are
learning about the other, even if there is no required disclosure of
information. When a supplier offers a concession on the invoice for
defective products the customer complained about without even looking
at the parts, it demonstrates that it is trustworthy and standing behind the
quality of its products. At the same time, the reasonableness of the buyer’s
232. Id. at 593 (“Buyers have few information disclosure obligations apart from a
duty to provide non-binding rolling forecasts on a monthly or quarterly basis.”).
233. See General Counsel Interview, supra note 20.
234. Gilson et al., Contracting for Innovation, supra note 35, at 482.
235. General Counsel Interview, supra note 20.
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complaint will signal to the supplier how trustworthy the buyer is. Is the
buyer trumping up complaints or registering reasonable objections? Or
is there a miscommunication of expectation between the parties that can
be corrected? This “joint effort” that occurs as parties interact with one
another can occur even without the formal information provisions in an
LTA. The degree of investment and performance might be greater when
parties are involved in a collaboration, but the same learning through
observing a party’s iterative, incremental performance can occur even
when parties operate purchase order by purchase order.
G. New Forms of Misbehavior Identified
LTAs, with their frameworks for information sharing, personnel
exchanges, and mechanisms for detecting and correcting error and
encouraging training to meet buyer standards, may foster the building
of social capital and trust and encourage collaboration to develop
innovative products.236 LTAs may facilitate informal enforcement in
another way. By detailing lots of ways in which suppliers are expected to
cooperate, buyers have new categories of misbehavior which broadens
“the types of behavior that can be sanctioned through reputational harm
or rewarded.”237 And these categories of cooperation or misbehavior do
not require judicial verification.238
Of course, if the LTA laid out an information sharing mechanism
that specified “the types of behavior that can be sanctioned through
reputational harm,”239 then the LTA would be broadening the basis for
imposing sanctions. But an LTA with a provision outlawing certain
behaviors would not need to exist in order for a buyer to sanction a
counterparty informally. For example, a buyer may be dissatisfied with
the performance of the supplier because the supplier was not
particularly cooperative or willing to make adjustments, even though
the supplier may have technically met the requirements of the
contract. In this case, the buyer could, and would, downgrade the
supplier in future dealings, even without any LTA provision that
required or ranked the supplier on cooperativeness. So, the question
remains whether the LTA provisions actually “broaden the self-

236.
237.
238.
239.

Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts, supra note 7, at 602–04.
Id. at 563.
Id. at 584.
Id. at 563.
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enforcing range of contractual obligations”240 or whether they are the
exclusive means of broadening the basis of sanctions.
1. Positive Benefits of LTAs: Planning Benefits and Centralization
In some cases, there are reasons to enter into LTAs that originate not from
an attempt to control contractual hazards but to achieve two other benefits.
One benefit from having a formal LTA is a planning benefit, which lays
out the obligations of the parties in a systematic way. There is a benefit to
parties in doing that “as a way of minimizing misunderstandings about
what current thinking is about the future.“241 Writing allows parties to
“identify incompletenesses in our thought processes, and even analytical
errors.”242 Written agreements governing long-term relationships are not
new, but outlining the planning benefits is important in terms of the
bargaining lens. How much weight do the parties place on a written
agreement that takes the form of an LTA? Does an LTA as a written
document for planning have a larger role in the innovation context where
parties must engage in a complex process of research and funding?243
Parties routinely resort to consulting the LTA when questions arise during
the course of the relationship and thereby depart from the usual practice
of rarely consulting contracts in a sale of goods context.
A second positive benefit of an LTA that takes the form of an SFK is
to “centralize decision-making.”244 Rather than allowing individual
managers to negotiate individual contracts, the implementation of the
LTA is centralized with unified control of what the terms look like. In
the context of OEMs and suppliers, where OEMs depend on many
suppliers for inventory items, the LTA SFK offers another advantage.
Buyers have to be able to assure suppliers that they are offering
standard terms to all suppliers and thus offering parity and that the
LTA offers that benefit.
VI. DIVERSIFIED STRATEGIES
Despite all the advantages that formal information sharing protocols
achieve that have been outlined earlier in this Article, some initial

240. Id.
241. Whitford E-mail, supra note 13.
242. Id.
243. Hadfield & Bozovic, supra note 2, at 996. Hadfield and Bozovic suggest that
the planning aspect in innovation contexts is a very important function.
244. Whitford E-mail, supra note 13.
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empirical research245 indicates that, parties do not adopt one uniform
approach to solving problems in supply chains and in collaborating;
the LTA is one mechanism, but parties may deliberately opt for other
ways of exchanging goods. Their choices may depend on a number of
factors including the transaction costs of negotiating an LTA, and
whether the LTA is needed to protect large sunk costs or capital
equipment specially manufactured for a buyer. Other arrangements
into which parties enter to protect their capital investments include:
(1) LTAs with a quantity term; (2) operating purchase order by
purchase order; (3) acting as a contract manufacturer and limiting
liability by executing a blueprint without any deviation; and (4) entering
into joint development projects that protect capital investments
exclusively by intellectual property (IP) and licensing mechanisms.
In thinking about why parties might adopt LTAs to govern their
relationship, it is important to note that parties exchanging goods, and
even developing new products, have a variety of ways to structure their
arrangements. Key benefits of some LTAs derive from the transfer of
information, which, in turn, facilitates informal governance and
constrains opportunism in the face of uncertainty about competence,
shirking and reliability. However, parties may devise other ways of
operating beyond the LTA without the information sharing protocols
(braiding mechanisms) discussed earlier. They will find ways, even
without an LTA, to engage in informal governance to achieve the quality
goals without resorting to a lawsuit. As Jennejohn explains, there is a “rich
diversity of governance strategies observed in the design of many alliance
contracts.”246 This Part explores these diversified strategies below.
A. LTA with a Quantity Term
Some parties may insist on an LTA that contains a quantity that
would make it legally enforceable ex ante.247 This is different than the
prototypical LTA studied by scholars because it contains a quantity
requirement and is immediately enforceable. A supplier may insist that
their LTA contain a provision that prevents the buyer from cancelling
without paying for work in the pipeline. If the supplier has invested in
large capital equipment or tooling costs, the supplier may insist that

245. Kostritsky & Ice Survey Results, supra note 18.
246. Jennejohn, supra note 10, at 290.
247. Interview with Supplier (June 16, 2017) [hereinafter Supplier Interview] (on
file with the American University Law Review).
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the LTA contain provisions providing for an exit termination fee or
minimum quantity requirement.
In some settings, the parties may find that informal enforcement
measures or reciprocal investments are not enough to deter potential
opportunism and that an LTA with firm purchase and monitoring
obligations is necessary. This is especially likely when there is no a
long-term arrangement between the parties and there are large capital
equipment costs that must be incurred by the supplier. When these
informal forces are unlikely to work because of the lack of ongoing
relations, or when a market dominant player is involved, the supplier’s
threat to impose reputational sanctions on a buyer (an original
equipment manufacturer) such as Boeing may not work. Then, a term
in a legally enforceable LTA that prevents the buyer from cancelling
without paying an exit termination fee or a minimum quantity term
may be important to a supplier. Some smaller manufacturers may
insist on such a provision before entering into an LTA with a buyer,
and they will not sign an LTA without a quantity term, thereby
ensuring its enforceability. Such suppliers are likely less concerned
about LTA provisions pertaining to information sharing, monitoring,
and trust building. As the party responsible for producing the fungible
commodity, these suppliers do not find learning by monitoring
provisions as important as some buyers do.
But it may be critical to have an enforceable contract that can offer
protection against opportunism if things go awry due to the large
investment in capital equipment.
If the volume is in the thousands or millions, supplier firms may be
unwilling to do business without an LTA, but there are other instances
in which parties forego an LTA. For suppliers manufacturing a unique
piece of equipment when there are no continuing purchases, having
an LTA or some other contract such as a purchase order that is legally
enforceable and that covers the capital equipment will be the key
issue.248 For a one-time 3D printing order, a firm may forego an LTA.249
The only risk is that the supplier will not get paid for that item. In that
instance, the transaction costs of negotiating an LTA are not warranted.
The decision about whether to enter an LTA with a quantity term
may depend on the potential for a lost sunk cost if the contract is not
enforceable. However, if the LTA is crafted by a large OEM, it may be

248. Id.
249. Id.

1676

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:1621

drafted in a very pro-buyer fashion, with mandated cost reductions
imposed on the supplier. In order to decide whether the LTA offers
enough value in terms of constraining opportunism, the supplier will
need to analyze the switching cost. Suppliers must determine if these
switching costs will offset some of the disadvantages of a continuing
cost reduction percentage imposed on an annual basis by a buyer and
the transaction costs of negotiating one.
B. Purchase Order by Purchase Order
Of course, there are alternative ways of doing business contractually
outside an LTA. A supplier can deliberately choose to operate
purchase order by purchase order, even with large OEMs.250 With the
purchase order by purchase order (“PO by PO”) means of doing
business, the supplier can attempt to introduce terms that are
favorable to it and may insist on terms that deal with warranty, damages
(particularly damages caps), insurance and indemnity, and disclaimers
of liability. Those provisions may be critical for suppliers whose
products are going to be used by buyers who will suffer large
consequential damages if a part malfunctions and a factory is shut
down or a catastrophic liability if a malfunctioning part causes an
airplane to crash and parties to be injured. Suppliers who operate PO
by PO may use informal mechanisms of adjustment that are extracontractual, but in some instances the contractual provisions will be
very important. Regardless of whether the supplier is signing an LTA
or operating on a PO by PO basis, the supplier may insist on getting
limits on damages and eliminating consequential damages.
The willingness to enter LTAs without a firm quantity requirement
but with elaborate information sharing requirements, or to enter an
LTA with a firm quantity requirement, may shift when asymmetric
investments or large sunk costs are absent. In such cases, suppliers may
be less willing to undertake the negotiation costs of entering into an
LTA or MSA. Instead, the supplier may opt to operate with a quote,
that is, a purchase order and acknowledgement. This is particularly
likely to be true when the supplier produces most of its products from
a catalog and the buyers buy from the catalog.251 The supplier could
sell its catalog products to others. In such cases, the supplier may insert
terms that favor itself in its acknowledgement order that it hopes will
250. General Counsel Interview, supra note 20.
251. Id.
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govern the transaction should there be a dispute. It can control the
content of the contract by rejecting terms that are in the buyer’s
purchase order and are harmful.
In cases where the sunk costs are low because the supplier is making
a fungible item or where the co-design is very limited, the costs of the
LTA may outweigh the benefits particularly when the LTA may contain
negative provisions like mandatory cost reductions on an annual basis.
The big threat that the supplier faces is that of the buyer reneging after
the supplier invests in large and expensive capital equipment. When
that is not present, the risks for the supplier are lower.
In addition, there is always the risk that a buyer will falsely claim that
the goods produced by the supplier are substandard or defective. But
those risks can be managed by adjustments between the parties. The
supplier can offer to replace defective products and pay for the cost of
shipping in order to keep the buyer happy. Then, as the relationship
goes on, the switching costs become real and acts as a deterrent to the
buyer falsely claiming defective products.
However, even if the parties often rely on informal adjustments,
there will be provisions that a supplier operating on a PO by PO basis
may insist on in the event that there is a lawsuit. One supplier has
indicated that the most important provisions concern warranty,
liability, damage caps, IP, insurance, and indemnity.252 These provisions
are likely to be important when informal ways of solving problems have
broken down and a lawsuit has been initiated. The lawsuit may be
initiated by a third party who is suing the buyer for an airplane that blew
up, or a medical device that malfunctioned that contained a part
manufactured by a supplier. In these kinds of circumstances, the liability
caps and consequential damages provisions may be key.
C. Contract Manufacturer
Another alternative means of managing the exchange of goods
occurs when the supplier chooses to protect itself by limiting its role to
that of a contract manufacturer. It may take the blueprints of a
medical supply company but refuse to put its insignia on the print or
to deviate from the buyer’s print in order to limit its own liability. The
liability exposure with medical devices is substantial, and the supplier
who coordinates on production of such a device may obtain protection
by becoming the implementer of a drawing made by someone else. In
252. Supplier Interview, supra note 247.
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such cases, they may operate without an LTA. The absence of a stream
of future orders would mean that the transaction costs of an LTA might
not be worth it. Finally, the supplier may coordinate with another
party on the joint development of a product. But, instead of using an
LTA, the supplier may instead protect itself and its investment through
an intellectual property and licensing agreement with the other party.
In other cases, where the goods are not customizable and are out of a
catalog, the parties may not use or need a network that results in an LTA,
and the absence of such a network may be optimal and efficient.253
D. Customizable Goods IP and Licensing Contracts
Even when the supplier does have large sunk costs and undertakes
to create a customizable product with another partner, it may decide
that it will protect itself against opportunism only with IP protections
in a contract and may forego using an LTA. In the case of a jointly
developed product, it may be impossible to describe the product for
purposes of a purchase order and the time horizon may be limited; the
joint product development will end with the product being successfully
created. By negotiating IP ownership rights, the supplier can protect
its sunk costs and therefore does not need to enter into an LTA. It
may not be able to describe the item with sufficient definiteness for
either a purchase order or an LTA, but it can negotiate the ownership
of the IP from the product that is jointly created. The question for
further research is what are the characteristics of a transaction that will
incline a supplier to use IP for joint product development rather than
an LTA. What can we learn from that choice?
E. Deliberately Choosing Diversified Strategies: The Tailoring of Contract
Form to Minimize Costs, Control Hazards, and Maximize Welfare
This Article suggests that because not all parties adopt the formal
information sharing arrangements in an LTA, opting to operate
purchase order by purchase order instead, the choice must be
253. “Ideal-typical networks presuppose: (1) an organizational field characterized by a
combination of unstable demand and either rapidly changing knowledge or complex
interdependencies and (2) the embedding of economic activity in social institutions that
simultaneously engender a continuous search for new information and safeguards against
opportunism . . . .” Schrank & Whitford, supra note 97, at 157. When there are not
“complex interdependencies,” the investment in the sharing protocols of information may
not be worth the transaction costs of negotiating the agreement. Id.
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explained by some additional costs posed by these formal information
sharing arrangements and the overall costs of an LTA. This Article
suggests that the costs of such formal information sharing protocols
and of entering an LTA might outweigh the benefits particularly where
a long-term relationship reduces uncertainty about competence and
trustworthiness, leads to a lock in effect and constrains opportunism,
making the information sharing protocols unnecessary.
Moreover, if the parties are part of a network of suppliers and buyers,
they may be able to acquire information about the behavior of parties
even without formal information sharing protocols. Where the supplier
can easily resell to others, because the part is a catalog part not requiring
large sunk costs, the need to secure a long-term commitment to recoup
those sunk costs would be absent, making the benefit of an LTA including
one with information sharing protocols less beneficial, particularly when
such agreements often contain terms onerous to the supplier. In such
cases, an LTA with sharing protocols may not be needed.
Finally, parties may avoid such agreements because the very sharing
protocols that facilitate informal enforcement by the buyer also can be
subject to abuse by the buyer who appropriates shared information and
gives it to a competitor of the supplier.
If the buyer today is dissatisfied with quality, it may refuse to buy, but
since the provision on quality is tied to the buyer’s own metrics of
excellence, a supplier would have difficulty suing a buyer for refusing
to take its products.254 This would lead the supplier to resort to selfhelp rather than relying on a judicial remedy and the supplier would
be incentivized to meet quality or risk a loss of the future business.
The decision to operate PO by PO, or by an LTA or as a contract
manufacturer or as the potential owner of the intellectual property
from a jointly created product seems to be deliberate. In some cases,
a supplier will have to sign an LTA or risk losing the business of an
OEM. In these cases, a supplier may not choose to enter an LTA
voluntarily and may be unhappy with the terms of the LTA. In other
cases, the supplier will resist signing an LTA, calculating that another
method of exchanging goods may be optimal.
Choosing a purchase order as the means of doing business may make
sense where the product is fungible. There, the costs of an LTA do not

254. This definitely gives buyers the upper hand. They do not necessarily have to
invest in the resources (research and development) to make the part that they need,
instead the supplier bears that burden. Then the buyer does not even need to buy.
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seem worth it. The supplier may be less worried about having the security
of an LTA where it can sell its catalog product to others. In addition, the
long history with a buyer may obviate the need for an LTA since the trust
generated from prior dealings may give both parties confidence that any
matters requiring adjustment can be worked out informally.
Moreover, even without the benefit of an LTA, the supplier can
exercise the kinds of informal reputational sanctions against a buyer who
reneges, and a buyer similarly can threaten to cut off future dealings with
suppliers who furnish substandard goods, even without resorting to legal
remedies against the supplier. The ability to exercise such informal
sanctioning is enhanced by being part of a network of suppliers and buyers.
The advantage of the LTA is that it has established mechanisms for
sharing information. These mostly obligate the supplier to furnish
information to the buyer including financial statements, to allow access
to the supplier’s plant, to participate in supplier training programs,
and to furnish information about the supplier’s costs. The constant
exchange of this information gives the buyer confidence about the
supplier’s competence and reliability. When the goods are non-fungible,
and the buyer depends on the products being up to buyer standards, these
devices sharing information give the buyer a way to detect problems before
they arise. They also eliminate errors due to supplier’s misunderstandings
about the buyer’s requirements.255 Where the contracts are long-term and
the buyer is depending on just-in-time production and low inventories,256
the buyer cannot afford to sue suppliers who renege so these sharing
protocols have value. Suppliers may choose to participate because they
have no choice or because in doing so, they furnish a credible commitment
to the buyer of their worth and quality.
Jennejohn has recently suggested that the presence of a veto
power—another type of governance sometimes present in an LTA—is
inconsistent with the braiding theorists since “the allocation of a veto
would allow a party to unilaterally undercut the mutual investment in
relationship-specific information that plays an important part in the
braiding model.”257 However, these veto provisions often concern
ownership rights. In assessing governance mechanisms, regardless of
type, the question is what provision will best achieve the parties’ goals
at the lowest cost. By giving a party a veto right, that is equivalent to a
255. See Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts, supra note 7, at 578.
256. See WHITFORD, supra note 2, at 17–18 (discussing trend away from customers
holding large inventory).
257. Jennejohn, supra note 10, at 290.
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“right to exclude,”258 the party with a property interest can ensure that
that interest is protected.
The presence of a veto right or unanimity ensures that there is a
clear rule as to who owned the foreground IP so that the matter of the
new property that was the product of the collaboration could be
properly recognized and the proceeds shared. Where a property right
is at stake, the problem is one that may not be solved by information
sharing or informal enforcement that are effective tools in insuring the
quality of goods. The matter of foreground IP rights should be
established by a clear rule. It is hard to see how informal enforcement
would be a means of enforcing a foreground IP right.259 Without the
protection of a right to exclude, the incentive to collaborate on an
innovative product would diminish.
Jennejohn sees the veto right as one that responds to a contractual
hazard not previously addressed by the contract innovation theories.260
He identifies a spillover as a risk not previously recognized. He would
therefore portray contracts as subject to multiple exchange hazards
that may require different types of responses, necessitating
mechanisms that can mitigate those hazards.261
In making all of these choices, parties will organize their exchanges
to minimize transaction costs and frictions to increase the surplus
generated. In evaluating whether the parties will adopt an LTA that is
legally unenforceable, an LTA that is enforceable ex ante, or another
strategy will depend on the fundamental question of whether the
benefits of adopting the mechanism exceed the costs, given certain
assumptions about human behavior. Williamson argues that parties
will choose their governance mechanisms in a way that will “attenuate
opportunism,” and thus create value for the exchange and increase
surplus.262 A failure to remedy such opportunism will cost parties
contractual surplus and thus they will use strategies to reduce that cost.

258. Id. at 324.
259. Id. at 309–10 (discussing the importance of establishing IP rights in innovation
contracts and criticizing Gilson et al.’s oversight of the importance of IP rights in the
contracts that form the basis of braiding theory).
260. Id. at 351–52.
261. Id. at 323.
262. WILLIAMSON, MECHANISMS, supra note 34, at 82.
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VII. INFORMAL REPUTATIONAL SANCTIONS WITHOUT AN LTA
The success of these alternatives to LTAs may depend on
understanding that many of the parties will have a variety of strategies for
dealing with uncertainties about the competence and reliability (another
term for opportunism) of their counterparty.263 Some of these strategies
are contractual, and some are informal mechanisms, and they can
operate in tandem and be complements. The LTA may be one means of
solving problems when there are significant problems of uncertainty and
opportunism. It may be a contract, but it is also a form of economic
governance that goes beyond the parties’ formal obligations. Some LTAs
facilitate a private extra-legal governance structure—which promotes
information transfer, collaboration, transparency, and trust—that is as
important as the legal enforcement of the parties. Of course, informal
enforcement can occur even without an LTA.
Even if there is no LTA, of course, the opportunism that operates as an
omnipresent threat to exchange relations could be managed informally
by threats to no longer do business or damage the other party’s reputation
in the industry. Thus, even without an LTA, informal sanctioning of one’s
counterparty is possible. These are the informal relational sanctions that
have been studied by scholars like Macaulay and Ian Macneil.264
In the past, buyers would enter agreements and informally request
information about supplier quality from other buyers or the suppliers
or have the supplier pre-qualify before bidding or rely on the supplier’s
reputation. However, there were not as many formal provisions for
suppliers sharing that information on a continuing basis. The
information sharing or acquisition might have occurred informally
rather than being the subject of a formal contractual agreement. Even
though many provisions for information sharing are now orchestrated
in a formal document, the provisions are largely self-enforcing. In
older agreements—even without as many formal sharing information
protocols—the consequences of displeasing the buyer were the same:
the loss of business or a reputational sanction.
For decades, scholars have recognized that when suppliers and
buyers had multiple informal ways of dealing with problems in the

263. See supra Section III.A.
264. See generally Macaulay, supra note 38, at 64; see also Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract
Theory as Sociology: A Reply to Professors Lindenberg and de Vos, 143 J. INSTITUTIONAL &
THEORETICAL ECON. 272, 276 (1987) (explaining that “friendship, reputation,
interdependence, morality, and altruistic desires are integral parts” of relational contracts).
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supply chain. As Macaulay recognized, the parties regarded suing their
counterparty as a last resort.265 If there were problems with a defective
product, a kind of opportunism through shirking, they would raise the
issue on a businessman-to-businessman level, or they would agree to
just give the buyer a credit for substandard goods.266 They might be
part of a network of businesses that would furnish information about
potential suppliers, which would solve the problem of asymmetric
information. Parties could achieve the same confidence about their
counterparty through repeated interactions with them. That would
lower the uncertainties about their counterparty’s competence,
provide reassurance on their reliability, and decrease their uncertainty
about the proclivities of the supplier to act opportunistically. They
could, without the benefit of an LTA, identify forms of misbehavior or
shirking that would cause them to lower their estimation of a supplier.
So, in many cases, even without an LTA spelling out the information
sharing protocols, buyers could secure this information in a variety of
ways. They could investigate suppliers with other buyers in a network
of buyers or ask suppliers to pre-qualify without putting these elaborate
mechanisms in an LTA. If parties were operating PO by PO, there would
be really no need to make the obligation to buy going forward
conditional on meeting the quality standards. Instead, the purchase
obligation evidenced by the purchase order itself would be made
contingent on the supplier meeting the standards in the quality manual.
In many cases, those threats may be more than adequate to do the
job, especially if parties are in a close-knit relational group such as
buyers and sellers in the diamond industry. However, if there is a
dominant market player, like Boeing in the aircraft industry, those
threats may not be as powerful, and the presence of a dominant player
may make informal sanctioning less likely.
Additionally, the threat to not do business with another party as kind
of reputational sanction will be more attenuated or less believable if
the party lacks information. Additionally, in more heterogeneous
markets, the relational informal sanctions may be less effective because
gaining information or sanctioning more remote players may be more
difficult. The LTA levels the playing field by requiring parties to share
information that could be used as the basis for either a reputational
sanction or some other self-help remedy afforded within the LTA. As such,

265. See Macaulay, supra note 38, at 61.
266. Id.
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while informal sanctions can operate as a governance mechanism without
an LTA, LTAs can enhance the effectiveness of such informal devices.
It is important to note that parties entering arrangements of
whatever type often resort to legal remedies only as a last resort.267
That was true fifty years ago, and it is true today. Therefore, it is not
surprising to find informal governance as much a part of LTAs as they
are also part of supply chains that are not governed by LTAs.
VIII. NETWORK GOVERNANCE
Regardless of whether parties contract using an LTA with
information protocols or operate PO by PO, suppliers and buyers may
have other mechanisms for informal enforcement. One device comes
from being part of a network that creates “structural social capital.”268
The LTA levels the playing field by requiring parties to share
information that could be used as the basis for either a reputational
sanction or some other self-help remedy afforded within the LTA
itself.269 This may be the case if they are part of a network which has
been defined as “a set of connections between individuals or between
organizations (here, firms).”270 Of course, if LTAs exist with information
sharing mechanisms, the adversely affected party could share
information about a supplier’s (or a buyer’s) misbehavior with the
network and thereby impose reputational sanctions broadly—even
beyond any relational contract that may exist.271
The presence of a network could affect whether a firm decides to
enter into the formal information sharing protocols in a modern LTA.
If a supplier or buyer is part of a network, it might be able to obtain
information without the formal information sharing contract
provision in an LTA. Presumably, there is nothing that would
constrain a member of a network from complaining about
opportunistic behavior or misbehaviors even without an LTA with

267. Id.
268. Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts, supra note 7, at 565.
269. Id. at 601 (noting that “network governance can and does work, even in contexts
where detailed information about transactors’ underlying behavior is not widely available”).
270. Id. at 599.
271. Id. at 599–601 (explaining that when firms are of closer proximity the equity
stake decreases, because the firms have more information about the others reputation
and abilities and because a larger firm would be able to more easily sanction a smaller
firm). “When these connections exist ‘they establish[] a link that lowers the costs (or
raises the accuracy) of subsequent communication.’” Id. at 599.
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information sharing protocols. Thus, being part of a network could
possibly lessen the need for an information sharing protocol in an
LTA. Presumably, firms would weigh the benefit of having the
information generated by the LTA and the information that could be
accessed through a network and then decide whether the costs of
negotiating an LTA are outweighed by additional informational
benefits not available by merely being part of a network.
Firms can be ranked on how close they are in terms of proximity and
centrality. “Two firms are said to be more proximate ‘when fewer
intermediaries separate two counterparties.’”272 These connections to
other firms can provide an alternative form of private governance. The
connections in a network allow the firms to circulate information
about others in the network. These networks can be so effective as a
source of information, which can sanction others in the network for
misbehaving, that they can substitute for other protective devices that
parties might use. In the biotech sphere, parties are likely to use equity
to control behavior by agents such as founders of a firm. However,
such equity participation declines when the biotech firm’s position in
a network is central.273 Thus, the party can control opportunism
through equity participation or through having a network position.
The network position provides a way of sanctioning anyone who
behaves opportunistically and that deters wrongdoing so there is less
of a need to assume an equity position to control such wrongdoing
through an ownership stake. The decline in equity participation in
biotech firms that are “deeply embedded”274 in networks demonstrates
that the networks provide a means of controlling opportunistic
behavior that may be less costly and more effective for the firm.
A network has significant advantages because it works in situations
in which securing a legal remedy might be difficult either because the
information or not public or not verifiable to a court. Sometimes
information about a strategic partner is not in the public domain, and
other times, the problem is the opposite one of having “noisy”
information.275 Studies suggest that networks can overcome these
obstacles and transmit information within and impose sanctions on the
272. Id. at 600.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. See id. at 601–02 (noting that the “information that is available publicly—namely
outcomes—is too noisy to convey useful information to putative contracting partners given
the low probability of success in such ventures and the wide variety of reasons they fail”).
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basis of information that a court could not rely on to act.276 This would
be true if the information were not observable or verifiable.277
These networks can function to sanction both misbehaving suppliers
and misbehaving OEMs or buyers. OEMs who are part of a network
may find information about their bad behavior travels easily within the
network and costs them reputational damage. Suppliers can also be
constrained by the fact that buyers who are in a network can access
information about suppliers from others in the network.
The presence of a network is not a product of an LTA with an
information sharing protocol. An LTA may operate in conjunction
with a network and facilitate sanctioning by transmitting information
about failures of a party to an LTA to cooperate with some of the
provisions. A buyer could tell others in the network of a supplier’s
failure to permit a plant inspection required by an LTA. The LTA
could mandate such access, but the likelihood that the buyer could rely
on such failure to successfully sue the supplier would be slim due to an
inability to show damages.278 However, the buyer could cite such noncooperation as behavior deserving to be worthy of comment and that
could help the buyer to deter misbehavior that did not amount to an
infraction that warranted a legal sanction.
The presence of these networks could presumably operate even
without an LTA. Suppliers and buyers who decide not to sign an LTA
and are operating PO by PO could still rely on a network as a means of
transmitting information about the other party to those in the network.
However, the LTA, by providing a series of steps suppliers might take,
may provide more sources of information about misbehaviors that
could be transmitted through the network, even if the misbehavior did
not warrant a lawsuit. But the network could also be used by suppliers
and buyers to transmit information about behaviors that one party
found objectionable, regardless of veracity. The advantage of a network
is that the information need not be verifiable to a court. It is possible
that even parties adopting another means of exchanging goods could
use a position in the network to transmit information with a resulting

276. Id. at 599 (explaining that network governance “can reduce the need for firms
to employ costly governance mechanisms and can make it possible for transactors to
use (and reliably bond) contract provisions that condition on information that would
not be either observable or verifiable to a court or other adjudicatory forum”).
277. Id.
278. Id. at 603.

2019] A BARGAINING DYNAMIC TRANSACTION COST APPROACH

1687

adverse reputational cost to the other party. Alternatively, being part of
these networks could result in positive reputational gains.279
IX. NETWORK FAILURES: WHY SHOULD WE CARE?
Regardless of whether the supplier and buyer enter into an LTA or some
other means of exchanging goods, such as PO by PO, all of these exchange
relations will be subject to subject to stresses, possible opportunistic
behavior. A pattern of what one scholar calls “hedging”280 may emerge.
This Part will look at why the networks set up by LTAs with
information sharing sometimes fail or suffer from “partial”281 use, and
why those failures might cause parties to seek other arrangements or
might prompt them to refuse to enter into the LTAs initially. Such
failures are “undertheorized.”282
While those studying framework contracts should be aware of the
role of informal enforcement, one should not overlook the granular
analysis of why LTAs with information sharing protocols fail or
underperform. When are the framework agreements likely to be
unstable? These arrangements are not static, and they may solve some
specific problems, respond to problems of unstable demand, and to
disperse knowledge and cost pressures.
However, LTAs with information sharing may underperform
because they are subject to the same frictions as all exchange
transactions like opportunism and partner unreliability. The “virtuous
circle”283 of the informal mechanisms constraining opportunism by
increasing switching costs by the buyer and seller may not work.
Studying failure gives us a window into how parties may react to some
of the threats in a framework contract, which is valuable to a lawyer
advising a client about participating in a network contract.
Understanding how LTAs can unravel and how parties react to possible
frictions in the relationships can be useful to advising clients because
it can measure the risk of entering into such arrangements.

279. Id. at 604–05 (demonstrating a network of firms through a diagram and
explaining that when there are more connections between firms, reputational
information about the firms will “flow easily through the market”).
280. See WHITFORD, supra note 2, at 100 (discussing hedging).
281. See id.
282. Schrank & Whitford, supra note 97, at 152.
283. See WHITFORD, supra note 2, at 99.
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Why is there only partial adoption of framework contracts?284 Why
is there hedging by both parties even when they are in an LTA? Part
of the reason for partial adoption comes with the misuse of
information by the buyer.285 In an ideal world the supplier shares
information on cost reductions through innovation at the supplier level,
which helps the buyer gain better pricing. However, if the buyer misuses
the supplier’s information by sharing the supplier’s innovations with
competitors, the supplier will hesitate to share information.
A supplier may cut back on sharing information on technology or
cost and it will “muddy the waters.”286 It will not share cost reduction
information in a timely fashion, fearing that it will just be subject to
additional demands for cost reductions. So, a provision that was
designed to achieve cost reductions and promote “sharing rules”287
may be subject to hedging by a supplier who cannot continually meet
cost pressures imposed by a buyer.
Thus, there is a spectrum of success in how the cooperative mechanisms
flowing from information sharing protocols are implemented. The
framework contracts are not a perfect system, and they are not static.
Inter-firm agreements are subject to the same pressures and contractual
hazards as all exchange transactions. Whether they survive depends on
whether the benefits from joint collaboration outweigh the costs.
Survival will also depend on whether the parties invest in
coordination in the joint effort, as in the Boeing Dreamliner case
where Boeing tried to cut costs by outsourcing more of the work to
external players. Boeing relied on fifty tier-1 suppliers to play major
roles in assembling different parts of the airplane.288 Numerous
coordination problems with the suppliers developed and led to delays
and significant problems. Boeing eventually took over one of the tier1 suppliers and vertically integrated with it.289 Similarly, lawyers
representing buyers who want to outsource may want to build in as
many points of contact as possible to ensure that there is likely
adequate coordination between the two firms.

284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.

See id. at 100 (discussing partial use of networks in response to opportunism).
See id. at 103.
Id. at 103–04.
Helper, Pragmatic Collaborations, supra note 22, at 472 (discussing “sharing rules”).
See Tang & Zimmerman, supra note 88, at 77–78.
See id. at 75.
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Interdepartmental strife can foster “[s]upplier confusion”290 and
contribute to network failure. There are cross pressures built into
firms between the purchasing department, which wants to cut costs,
and the engineering department, which wants the next new innovation and
the alliance to succeed.291 These cross pressures are difficult to eliminate,
and suppliers should be aware of their existence and explain the risk.
X. THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTRACT AND LEGAL ENFORCEMENT
REMEDIES: WHAT ROLE SHOULD COURTS PLAY?
The informal extralegal governance of parties’ exchanges in the
supply chain context and the breakdown or partial adoption of such
informal governance force us to consider both the limits of legal
controls and the limits of informal governance. In considering the
prevalence of informal enforcement, Macaulay asked, “Why does
business ever use contract in light of its success without it?”292
Macaulay’s insights on the limits of legal enforcement derived from his
seminal studies of Wisconsin manufacturing businessmen where he
found they rarely invoked the law.293 When is it dysfunctional to invoke
the law and when is it functional to resort to contract law enforcement?
How, if at all, does the diversity of arrangements, the parties’ goals, and
the uncertainties they face affect that question?
This Article demonstrates that parties utilize a variety of
arrangements. Some are legally enforceable, while others, like LTAs
without a quantity term, are not enforceable until the first purchase
order is made. Of course, the cost of lawsuits is prohibitive, and informal
enforcement by the parties exists even if the supplier and buyer operate
PO by PO with legally enforceable terms, since the parties rarely resort
to invoking these terms by suing a counterparty. Often, parties will rely
on informal practices to sort out problems that arise during the supply
contract—for example, entering into informal arrangements for
defective products. A supplier may allow the buyer to return products
worth $20,000 per each delivery period even without the buyer’s actually
returning the goods for inspection by the supplier.294 The cost of the
supplier’s examining the goods for defects does not warrant the return

290.
291.
292.
293.
294.

WHITFORD, supra note 2, at 115.
See id.
Macaulay, supra note 38, at 62.
Id.
General Counsel Interview, supra note 20.
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shipping costs buyer would need to incur. Thus, an informal
arrangement may occur where the buyer can get a prearranged reduction
from its invoiced amount.295 This informal practice might be similar to a
more formal provision in an LTA that relieves the buyer of an obligation
to buy if the goods do not meet a particular quality metric.296
Whenever there is a pattern of informal enforcement, the question
that arises is what role should the courts play? Should it lend legal
enforcement and, if so, to which parts of the parties’ arrangements
when there is a breakdown?297 Should the existence of formal
agreements that help promote informal enforcement affect the
assessment of whether legal enforcement should be available? And, if
so, to what extent? Should the court limit itself to imposing low
powered sanctions, as the contract innovation scholars suggest,298 or
should it impose high powered sanctions and, if so, of what type and
why? Answering these questions should depend on a bargaining lens
cost minimization approach requires analyzing whether the court can
intervene at a low cost and on whether intervention will crowd out
informal sanctions and raise the cost of enforcement.
The general expectation in most contracts is parties will rely heavily
on informal enforcement to ensure parties adhere to their contractual
obligations. If parties adopt informational protocols that make
informal enforcement easier and less costly, and the transaction costs
of adoption are justified by offsetting benefits, have the parties
fundamentally changed expectations about when and to what extent
legal enforcement will be available? Even with LTAs that may facilitate
informal enforcement, there will be contractual provisions that deal
with issues such as indemnity, damage limitations, warranty limitations,
and indemnity for loss to third parties. And, if such provisions are not
covered in the LTA, they may still be contained in a purchase order.
These provisions will be important if the relationship breaks down
295. Id.
296. See Kraft Foods MSA, supra note 151, § 8.3.
297. Professor Lisa Bernstein has raised an analogous question in the context of
relational contracts. If the informal norms break down, should a court continue to
enforce these relational norms? She suggests no, since the relational norms have
broken down and been replaced by “end game” norms. See Lisa Bernstein, Merchant
Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U.
PA. L. REV. 1765, 1796 (1996) [hereinafter Bernstein, Merchant Law] (discussing end
game norms as precluding incorporation of preexisting relational norms that
preceded the breakdown of the relationship).
298. See Gilson et al., Braiding, supra note 4, at 1424; Jennejohn, supra note 10, at 357.
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because of the misuse of information by the buyer, failure of the braiding
mechanisms, or if the supplier or buyer is sued by a third party regarding a
product that the supplier has sold to a buyer. So, parties entering into
contracts, even when they fully expect that most disputes will be resolved by
informal means, certainly do not forego the right to legal enforcement.
One interviewee stated that the most important provisions in any purchase
order are warranty, indemnity, liability caps, and IP provisions.299
The fundamental question facing courts is what kind of enforcement
is appropriate if some provisions are, at least partially, enforced by
informal means. Answering that question requires an understanding
of the effects of legal enforcement when parties have informal
mechanisms for enforcing their obligations. Some scholars postulate
that legal enforcement would “crowd[] out” informal enforcement.300
Other scholars have argued that legal enforcement can complement
informal mechanisms and thus add value to the exchange.301
The choice of enforcement mechanism should be analyzed using
the bargaining lens, taking into account the parties’ individual
interests and the parties’ joint interest in an agreement that will
maximize value while minimizing transaction costs. That bargaining
lens suggests that the choice of an enforcement mechanism should
depend on whether legal enforcement would serve the parties’ joint
interests of minimizing transaction costs, constraining opportunism,
and maximizing value. Where a party’s opportunistic conduct is brazen
and easily detectable, a court’s failure to constrain the party’s
opportunistic conduct would be destructive because the anticipated
failure of courts to intervene when appropriate would deter parties
from entering agreements or investing.302
Despite the theoretical availability of informal enforcement through
reputational sanctions or through a network, networks or inter-firm
arrangements can fail for a variety of reasons—raising the question of
what legal enforcement scheme would be optimal in such contexts. High
powered enforcement can be justified using a transaction cost
minimization approach. A close analysis of crowding out phenomenon in
the literature also affects enforcement of obligations in the supply chain.
That analysis suggests that concerns about crowing out are exaggerated.
299. General Counsel Interview, supra note 20.
300. Jennejohn, supra note 10, at 295.
301. See, e.g., Gilson et al., Braiding, supra note 4 (examining the entwinement of
formal and informal mechanisms).
302. See infra notes 300–09 and accompanying text.
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The braiding contract theorists who emphasize informal
enforcement, information sharing protocols, and the potential for
crowding out argue that courts should and do play a limited role in
legal enforcement.303 They argue courts should enforce only the part
of the LTA contract that leads to braiding, such as the information
disclosure protocols, and should restrict themselves to enforcing such
protocols, perhaps by issuing an injunction.304 Under this theory,
courts should not enforce high-powered sanctions, at least in settings
involving collaboration on an innovation, since awarding expectation
damages would necessarily sanction a party for the failure to reach the
ultimate agreement. The argument is that there is no crowding out if the
court declines to issue high-powered sanctions, but there would be
crowding out if the court interfered with the “maintenance of the
collaborat[ive] protocols.”305 The courts should leave the “collaboration
protocols established by the parties . . . entirely within the province of the
internally generated, informal enforcement mechanism.”306 Thus, if a
party fails to share information, there would be a low-powered sanction.
Even under this approach, when the parties have deliberately breached
the collaborative agreement to share information and engaged in “a
(secret) alternative process that undermined the trust . . . generated
through braiding,”307 the court should police breaches of those
obligations but limit recovery to reliance damages; expectation
damages should not apply.308
The argument for low-powered sanctions is premised on the idea
that there are two parts to these contracts: (1) the information
braiding, and (2) the production of an actual product. For example,
when big pharma companies collaborate with small biotech firms,
contract innovation scholars argue that courts should be reluctant to
grant a high-powered sanction, which would sanction a party for the
failure to produce the ultimate product envisioned by collaboration,
because it would be an “attempt to regulate the nature or course of the
collaborative interactions.”309

303. See id.
304. See Jennejohn, supra note 10, at 358.
305. Gilson et al., Braiding, supra note 4, at 1418.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 1416 (limiting damages to reliance costs incurred).
309. Id. at 1417–18. For a similar reason, courts would decline to enforce a
purchase obligation when the supplier did not meet the excellence standards set by
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These contracts combine “information exchange and dispute
resolution mechanisms that support the informal contract—governing
the search for a product—and the high-powered formal contractual
regime—governing a product’s commercialization—[which] prevent[]
the formal incentives of the latter from crowding out the informal
behavior induced by the former.”310 The sanctions for the breach of the
formal nested options for commercialization will not crowd out the
informal sanctions since they cover separate matters. The danger of
crowding out occurs when a court administers a legal sanction for
breach of what had been governed by an informal norm,311 thereby
potentially undermining it.
Thus, in any case, where there is informal enforcement as in the
supply chain, the question is what legal sanctions could or should be
imposed without increasing the danger of crowding out informal norms?
The resolution requires that the crowding out evidence be assessed. Only
then can we decide if the crowding out thesis should be applied to the
supply chain for goods more generally and, if so, what implications would
crowding out have for questions of legal intervention.
In some ways, examining the collaboration for innovation—with its
neat separation of the iterative sharing of information from the
contract provisions for the final product—makes this analysis too easy
to conclude that high powered sanctions would be inappropriate since
that means awarding expectation damages that should only be
obtained for the final product. The question is whether there is any
basis for awarding high-powered damages for conduct during the
iterative exchanges. That inquiry has the most relevance for supply
chain governance, as there are no nested options that neatly separate
production of a final product from the iterative process that is
governed mostly by informal sanctions.
The first question is whether the evidence for crowding out is
persuasive and relevant to non-experimental, real life settings. Because
arguments against enforcement of informal norms depend on experiments,
they may have limited applicability to actual, non-experimental settings.
These experiments study the effect of imposing a legal sanction to govern
conduct breaches previously regulated by an informal norm.
the buyer. In each case the initial contract would not predict, in the case of a supply
chain, if the supplier would meet the final target of quality and in the case of an
innovated product, whether it would ever be produced.
310. Id. at 1409.
311. See id. at 1400; see also Bohnet et al., supra note 25, at 132.
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One study evaluated the effect of imposing a fine on parents who
pick up their children late from daycare when picking up their
children in a timely fashion was previously governed by an informal
norm.312 The study showed that the fine decreased compliance with
the agreed upon pick up time, which was a “performance
obligation.”313 Higher compliance resulted when parents regarded
compliance as a norm to be adhered to, rather than a sanction to be
avoided.314 This reduction in compliance may exist because, in settings
where community norms are powerful, norms may be a low-cost way of
achieving the parties’ goals. Because norms are a low-cost and efficient
way to achieve a desired outcome, switching to a less efficient, in this
setting, method of policy enforcement through sanction may have
necessarily reduced compliance.
The arguments for crowding out based on this daycare study have
several limitations. First, the fine was misinterpreted by the parents as
a license to be late and gave the wrong incentive toward creating or
reinforcing a norm of being on time. A fee that is viewed as a cost does
not crowd out a norm; rather, it moves the norm in the wrong
direction. Had the authors of the study picked a different penalty,
such as barring a child whose parent was late, then the penalty would
have fostered a norm of being on time. The fine imposed simply fed
into the parents’ self-interest in being late.
Second, the arguments of crowding out are built on an assumption
of a zero-sum game in which we have either informal and
unenforceable norms or we have litigation. Gilson, Sabel, and Scott
separate norm enforcement from exchange: “the parties’ behavior will
change depending on whether they understand their interaction as
norm-based or as exchange-based.”315 Yet, every contract is exchange
based and the parties will make adjustments within that exchange to
new realities. Doing so is a positive-sum game, as long as the parties
share a perception of what their interests are and how to balance their
interests against another’s to keep the relationship going. They
negotiate in the shadow of legal intervention, and if both parties share
predictions about what judges would do, then the possibility of legal
intervention will increase cooperation. If one party steals another’s
valuable research, then the idea is that a lawsuit would be available.
312.
313.
314.
315.

Gilson et al., Braiding, supra note 4, at 1400.
Id.
See id.
Id.
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One party would be taking action that makes another party worse off.
In such cases, it is the right to sue that keeps the partners within
reasonable bounds. The potential for lawsuits encourages partners to
be reasonable—assuming that judges can identify which party is being
unreasonable316—and their rules will induce, or crowd in, reasonable
accommodations and crowd out opportunism.
So, while crowding out of informal norms may occur and result in
less intrinsic compliance with norms, the effect of sanctions does not
necessarily result in the reduced compliance seen in the daycare setting.
Moreover, these experimental studies are based on gift exchanges
involving only one exchange with no possibility of repeat play.
Questions still remain about how the threat of formal sanctions that
are strong will operate in an actual non-gift setting, where repeat play
or access to a network might be possible. One should not necessarily
conclude that sanctions in the supply chain context will result in
reduced compliance, as even these studies show the amount of
compliance depends on the severity of the threatened sanction.
Furthermore, the “cognitive shift” moving parties away from interior
norms to income maximization may still result in greater net benefits
to the parties. Should we necessarily be worried if sanctions move
parties away from interior compliance? Norms and interior remedies
are a response parties use to minimize costs and increase surplus from
an exchange. The tradeoff between interior enforcement and external
enforcement may change depending on the cost calculus.
Scholars debating whether formal sanctions will “crowd out”
informal sanctions or will act as a complement to informal sanctions
reach different conclusions.317 This debate rests on a static theory of
norms or informal sanctions in which the norms or informal sanctions
are continuously working effectively.
However, when relationships and norms deteriorate, the argument
against crowding out has less force. Crowding out is not inevitable;

316. See Peter M. Gerhart & Juliet P. Kostritsky, Efficient Contextualism, 76 U. PITT. L.
REV. 509, 518 (2015) (arguing that courts should hold parties accountable based on
their obligations rather than by trying to determine intent). But see Jody S. Kraus &
Robert E. Scott, Contract Design and the Structure of Contractual Intent, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1023, 1023 1029–30 (2009) (arguing that court determination of the intent of the
parties is costly but essential and questioning equitable doctrines that override intent).
317. See generally Sergio Lazzarini et al., Order with Some Law: Complementarity versus
Substitution of Formal and Informal Arrangements, 20 J.L., ECON., & ORG. 261 (2004);
Gilson et al., Braiding, supra note 4, at 1400.
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whether crowding out is likely to occur or will reduce welfare depends
on the circumstances.
A more dynamic view of norms—one that is consistent with the
evolution of norms—shows that norms sometimes start out as selfenforcing norms and then are adopted by governments when
government adoption can promote efficiencies not available with
localized self-enforcement of the norms. For example, customs of
weights and measures began as institutions designed to lower
measurement costs and promote trade.318 This might occur when local
customs as to weights and measures, technology improved and trade
expanded, making it possible to achieve uniformity and promote trade
at greater distances.319 Driving on the right could also start out as a
self-enforcing coordination norm but shift to a government adoption
in order to provide advantages not available under a self-enforcement
system such as the education of newcomers.320
Recognizing the dynamic that norms can originate as self-enforcing
norms but then migrate to government adoption when efficiencies can
be achieved suggests that the question of formal sanctions of informal
norms should not depend on a stylized debate based on conflicting
empirical data about the effect of formal enforcement on informal
norms but on a dynamic view that parties will adopt whatever system
will achieve the most gain from trade. In some instances, parties can
effectively self-enforce but if private strategies, such as hedging cannot
work to control opportunistic behavior, then the parties would want a
formal sanction; formal sanctions will not inevitably undermine
informal sanctions. The goal should not be to preserve informal
enforcement but to adopt the best method to serve the parties’ joint
interests. In the innovation context, the development of norms that
keep parties moving toward producing a final product provides the
basis for positive sum cooperation and zero sum opportunism. The
legitimate role of courts is to oversee the terms of the cooperation to
minimize zero-sum opportunism. This role follows from the
bargaining lens theory with its emphasis on which strategy or strategies
will produce the greatest net benefits for the parties.
Concerns about crowding out of informal enforcement norms might
also be misplaced for another reason. Informal enforcement of a pre318. DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
PERFORMANCE 41 (1990).
319. Id.
320. Kostritsky, supra note 26, at 500.
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existing norm depends on the parties’ creation of a norm, such as truth
telling, which can “constitute a bedrock of virtues that facilitate all
exchanges.”321 Norms are powerful practices, such as “a set of cultural
rules of behavior.”322
The informal enforcement that results from the information
protocols may not actually amount to a norm constituting an
institution or a way of solving problems, such as honesty. Informal
enforcement based on shared information might cause a buyer to
refrain from buying goods under an agreement that permitted buyers
to decline to buy goods that did not meet its quality standards. It might
permit a buyer receiving the information to benchmark problems in
production so as to make better products. But these informal ways of
enforcing standards and solving problems, while withholding any
resort to legal enforcement, seem to fall short of a norm that would
result in collective punishment enforced by all who subscribed to the
norm. Instead, the informal enforcement amounts to a kind of selfhelp for a single party. If looked at in this way, research suggesting that
norms would be displaced by formal enforcement, and therefore the
experimental studies on crowding out norms, may not be relevant in
deciding if formal enforcement is justified.
Even if one accepts (1) that crowding out can occur when the law
sanctions conduct that is subject to a pre-existing norm, (2) that those
results could carry over to exchanges in the supply chain, and (3) then
agrees with the contract innovation scholars that a high-powered
sanction that tries to regulate the final product is inappropriate since
it is not clear what the ultimate product will be, that does not resolve
whether, why, and when a court should intervene beyond enforcing
information protocols or go beyond such low powered sanctions.
In deciding on legal enforcement, this Article suggests reframing the
argument about whether to impose high-powered or low-powered
sanctions slightly differently. When parties draft any provision in a
contract, the provisions are often designed to control certain risks or
hazards that are inherent in any exchange. Some information sharing
protocols are there to deal with the problems of uncertainty about the
future behavior of the supplier: Will it be compliant and meet
standards of excellence or will it instead engage in shirking?323
321. Id. at 486.
322. Greif, supra note 27, at 543.
323. E-mail from Ronald J. Coffey, Professor Emeritus of Law, Case Wes. Res. U.
Sch. of Law, to Professor Kenneth B. Davis, Fred W. & Vi Miller Dean Emeritus, U. Wis.
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Other uncertainties involve whether the supplier will be able to meet
cost reduction goals and lower prices over time? In the big pharma
context or another collaborative joint venture, the information protocols
help reduce uncertainty about the other party and offer assurance that
each party will invest in developing or funding a project. Without the
informational protocols to reassure parties of such reciprocal investments,
a party might be reluctant to make the initial investment. The provisions
that have suppliers participating in excellence contests and gaining
training on the buyer’s needs are all devices that the buyer implements
to deal with the uncertainty about the supplier’s future behavior. These
provisions may also have the effect of raising switching costs and making
informal enforcement possible as the parties learn more about each
other and learn to trust one another. There may be a build-up of social
capital and informal enforcement.
But courts should recognize that these framework contracts
governing inter-firm exchanges are subject to the same frictions and
stresses that afflict every exchange, such as opportunistic behavior, that
are difficult to control by contract. And when the relationship breaks
down, informal enforcement may no longer work since it is an endgame situation.324 When parties adopt provisions for indemnity, or
third-party dues, or a damage cap, they are specifically contemplating
a situation where a lawsuit has occurred. All are end-game situations.
In such cases, the expectation would be that all legal sanctions would
be available. If the parties have not ruled out resorting to the
judiciary,325 it would seem that courts should be willing to intervene
when the informal norms are not working to constrain a breach of a

Law Sch. (May 2, 1996, 2:42 PM) (on file with the American University Law Review)
(discussing “propensity to diverge” as a form of shirking).
324. See Bernstein, Merchant Law, supra note 297, at 1796. Professor Lisa Bernstein
argues against the incorporation of “relationship-preserving norms” in an end game
situation. Relationship-preserving norms “are clear and well-developed, they may be
quite different from the terms of transactors’ written contracts, which contain the
norms that transactors would want a third-party neutral to apply in a situation where
they were unable to cooperatively resolve a dispute and viewed their relationship as
being at an end-game stage (‘end-game norms,’ or ‘EGNs’).” Id.
325. See Lisa Bernstein, Opting out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations
in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 115 (1992) (explaining that in some
cases, parties do rule out a resort to the judiciary, for example “[t]he diamond industry
has systemically rejected state-created law”).
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contractual obligation that does not relate solely to the informational
protocols, or is a blatant abuse that will deter investment.326
The issue should be whether the law should supplement the
informal enforcement. To answer that, analysts should consider that
both norms and laws develop to solve problems and permit society and
the parties to thrive while minimizing costs. Laws and norms are both
“different ways of achieving those ends.”327 Intervention with law might
be appropriate where some parties adhere to inefficient norms328 or
norms that are ineffective or degrading.329 To achieve those goals,
would the law be able to intervene without causing costs that outweigh
the benefits of intervention?
Thus, the question for courts is “whether the non-governmental
means . . . are effective and self-enforcing.”330 The government should
analyze the effectiveness by looking at which law, or combination of
laws, would best minimize cost and achieve the parties’ goals.331
Sometimes legal intervention will result in achieving goals and
solving externalities with cost minimization. If a law is passed that
regulates dog litter, passing that law will empower informal
enforcement.332 Without a law regulating the conduct, it will be
difficult to control the externality because of collective action
problems333 and the cost and difficulty of identifying peripatetic
violators. The law’s adoption will encourage informal norms, and the

326. Of course, in devising a sanction, courts might consider research that shows that
higher sanctions might result in higher compliance in some settings. See Peter Verboon &
Marius van Dijke, When do Severe Sanctions Enhance Compliance? The Role of Procedural Fairness,
32 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 120, 121 (2011) (emphasis omitted) (“[S]evere sanctions may be
effective in stimulating compliance because they tend to increase moral disapproval . . . .”).
327. Kostritsky, supra note 26, at 481.
328. Id. at 503 (discussing dueling norms).
329. See Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms: The Case of Tax Compliance, 86 VA. L.
REV. 1781, 1787 (2000).
330. Kostritsky, supra note 26, at 494.
331. Id.
332. See id. at 502–03.
333. The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics considers a collective action as
when “individuals in some group really do share a common interest, the furtherance
of that common interest will automatically benefit each individual in the group,
whether or not he has borne any of the costs of collective action. Thus the existence
of a common interest need not provide any incentive for individual action in the group
interest.” Mancur Olson, Collective Action, in 1 NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS 876 (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume, eds., 2d ed. 2008).
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law and norms operating together can lower the cost of achieving
certain goals—like less dog litter at the lowest cost.
If the conduct is blatant, opportunistic action, as in Eli Lily & Co. v.
Emisphere Technologies, Inc. (Emisphere I),334 then the answer as to whether
the law should intervene is yes.335 The question is what we can learn
from Emisphere’s outcome?336 One lesson from the Emisphere decisions
is that when informal mechanisms are not enough to constrain
opportunistic behavior, there is a breakdown and informal norms are
no longer functioning, and that the court can easily intervene at a low
cost to sanction opportunistic behavior because the behavior is such a
blatant breach of trust, the court will do so.
But this would not be the case if the intervention would be costly. If
one party, such as a buyer, uses cost information to pressure the other,
the supplier, to reduce its prices, it would be hard for a court to
determine if that use of information was opportunistic. Thus, the most
appropriate method for controlling the misuse of such information is
hedging by the other party, who withholds information in response to
what it perceives as a misuse of information.
But if the buyer expropriates the supplier’s property, a court should
enforce full expectation damages. That is essentially what the court
granted in Emisphere II, when it issued an injunction against Eli Lilly
and granted Emisphere a patent337 where it was clear that Eli Lilly had
appropriated the research work of Emisphere to gain its own patent.338
The court’s willingness to assign Emisphere the patent does not, as
Jennejohn suggests, appear to constitute a low-powered sanction.339
Gilson, Sabel, and Scott argue that the court still imposed a lowpowered sanction because it did not interfere with the braided
mechanism where informal sanctions were working, but rather sanctioned
conduct that “undermined the trust that was in fact generated through
braiding.”340 Gilson, Sabel, and Scott seem to want to leave the informal
334. 408 F. Supp. 2d 668 (S.D. Ind. 2006).
335. See Jennejohn, supra note 10, at 357 (summarizing the Emisphere II decision
where Emisphere’s request for specific performance was granted and Lily assigned
patent rights to Emisphere).
336. See generally Eli Lilly & Co. v. Emisphere Techs., Inc. (Emisphere II), No.
103CV1504DFHTAB, 2006 WL 1131786, at *4 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 25, 2006) (entering a
decision on the relief requested).
337. Id. at *3–4.
338. See Emisphere I, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 673, 685, 697.
339. Jennejohn, supra note 10, at 357.
340. Gilson et al., Braiding, supra note 4, at 1418.
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enforcement protocols intact and allow intervention only when the action
fell outside braiding because it “undermined the trust.”341
Jennejohn described the court’s willingness to award the patent to
Emisphere as a high-powered sanction, not a low powered sanction,
and a response to the separate problem of spillover, not covered by
informal enforcement, thus making the need to protect any braiding
irrelevant.342 Jennejohn’s argument for broad enforcement of LTAs
states that, in considering a legal response, one must consider that
these LTAs are comprised of many provisions.343 There are formal
contract provisions in these agreements to control certain distinct risks
like spillover, which is a kind of expropriation of property. Since
provisions designed to prevent a particular problem are not intended
to promote informal enforcement, then there is no reason for a court
to withhold legal enforcement of the provisions, and the court should
grant full recovery of expectancy damages.
There is another way to look at the issue of the appropriate level of
sanctions. Courts should not be limited to enforcement of the
information braiding protocols. They are there to deal with
uncertainties and control certain problems for parties—like
uncertainties about shading and quality of product—but sometimes
whatever the protocols and the arrangement, one party will act
opportunistically at the expense of the other, even when they have
agreed to information sharing protocols that would ideally promote
trust and social capital. Enforcing a contract that has provisions that
may promote informal enforcement does not mean the parties intend
to take legal enforcement off the table. In many LTAs, or in the
purchase order that references or incorporates the LTA, there are
important provisions intended to deal with contingencies when there
is a lawsuit. Those should be enforced, as should the provisions related
to distinct risks. For example, a court should enforce provisions about
the expropriation of property that’s boundaries may be uncertain or
provisions to constrain opportunistic behavior that amounts to “‘redfaced’ cheating,”344 which cannot be controlled by the express
information sharing mechanisms. Even though Jennejohn and Gilson,
Sabel, and Scott agree with some level of intervention—Jennejohn

341.
342.
343.
344.

Id.
Jennejohn, supra note 10, at 357–59.
See id. at 291.
See Gilson et al., Braiding, supra note 4, at 1384, 1417–18, 1430.
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because of the distinct risk posed by spillover,345 and Gilson, Sabel, and
Scott because intervention would still leave the informal enforcement
structure intact and separate from a cheating situation346—there may
be another way to justify intervention that uses a different approach,
one that is consistent with achieving the parties’ goals of controlling
opportunistic behavior while minimizing costs.
The approach suggested here based on transaction cost
minimization for achieving parties’ goals is broad enough that it could
be used in a variety of settings. It should not matter whether we allow
court enforcement that extends beyond informal enforcement
because we decide that the conduct is outside of the properly
functioning informal sanctions or because we call it a distinct risk, such
as expropriation. What matters is that there is some conduct that
cannot be controlled by contract or by informal sanctions when the
gains from opportunistic conduct are large. In such cases, the parties
would want to control that conduct if doing so can be done in a costeffective way. When the breach of trust is blatant, as in the Emisphere
cases, the court should intervene because it can control opportunism
without creating costs that outweigh the benefits.
The idea that, to control opportunism, the law should (1) control
opportunistic behavior through intervention when the costs of doing so
do not outweigh the benefits, and (2) control distinct risks—such as
spillover or blatant breaches of trust, all of which are difficult to control
by contract—finds support by analogy in the recent scholarship of
Professors Ariel Porat and Scott. They suggest that in “spiderless”
networks the control of moral hazard may be difficult to control by “legal
mechanisms.”347 In such cases, they suggest a law granting a limited
restitutionary recovery to limit free riding caused by externalities.348 Of
course, if such opportunistic behavior occurs in an ongoing relationship,
one party can hedge or withhold information as a private response to the
opportunistic use of information for one party’s private benefit.349
But where the parties are at an end point, and a party plans to end
the relationship by appropriating intellectual property of the other
345. Jennejohn, supra note 10, at 293.
346. Gilson et al., Braiding, supra note 4, at 1387.
347. Ariel Porat & Robert E. Scott, Can Restitution save Fragile Spiderless Networks?, 8
HARV. BUS. L. REV. 1, 1 (2018).
348. Id. at 7.
349. WHITFORD, supra note 2, at 104 (discussing withholding of information as a
counterstrategy to opportunistic use of information).
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party, a low-powered sanction to enforce the informational sharing
protocols or a remedy limited to reliance would seem insufficient to
deter opportunistic conduct. Where the gains from appropriation are
large enough, the ability to self-enforce through reputational sanctions
may be insufficient. So, while the formal provisions may facilitate
informal enforcement, in some instances the informal enforcement
mechanisms will fail. If the court can intervene to control blatant
opportunistic behavior and can do so at a low cost, because the
conduct is blatant, it should do so because the parties would want
intervention to achieve their goals. Without the possibility of court
intervention, parties would be reluctant to invest and that would act as
a drag on gains from trade. The parties negotiate and will make
adjustments in the shadow of the law and if the parties both make
predictions about what a reasonable judge would do, then the
possibility of legal intervention can increase cooperation. So rather
than being a zero-sum game—where you gain from informal
negotiations or you gain from litigation but not from both—in fact,
you do not need to give up the advantages of litigation to have
successful informal adjustments in a contractual relationship.
Finally, one reason to allow contract enforcement beyond the lowpowered sanctions derives from the reasons for the existence of
informal enforcement. For example, parties informally enforce
provisions about the quality of a product because the cost of suing is
too high. The parties are making a tradeoff. Informal enforcement
may be the least costly way to achieve the parties’ objectives. However,
when the harm is sufficiently great, the injured party may want to sue
and seek high-powered sanctions because the tradeoff is now different.
In some instances, the harm will be grave enough to justify the legal
costs, so enforcement should not be withheld. The experiments do
not answer this, because they studied the effects of choosing to impose
fines across the board on all parties who violate a rule—such as picking
up children in a timely fashion from daycare.
XI. ADVICE TO CLIENT
The spectrum of success in supply networks and the range of
mechanisms that parties have for transferring goods have important
implications for how lawyers advise clients who are concerned about
opportunistic behavior of their counterparties and how to structure
the transactions involving the sale of goods.

1704

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:1621

The diversity of supply chain arrangements should play a critical role
in informing how lawyers advise clients in the supply chain. Lawyers
can add value for their clients by considering this Article’s insights on
LTAs, both SKFs and bespoke agreements, governance dispute
mechanisms, and alternative agreements. In selecting a form of
agreement, lawyers should advise clients to consider the functions and
individual interests of the parties. Clients should strive for an
agreement that minimizes transaction costs while constraining
opportunism. The agreement should also be able to guide and shape
planning an enterprise, constrain managers, and offer parity of
contract to suppliers and the elements of failed agreements.
Where the goods are not customizable but are catalog items, it may
make sense for a supplier to forego signing an LTA, particularly if the
terms require annual percentage-based cost reductions. The benefits of
an LTA offering the security of purchase obligations by the buyer may
not matter where there are not large transaction specific investments
that can only be recouped by a long-term purchase arrangement.
The lawyer may advise the client to operate instead purchase order
by purchase order. The parties can and probably will operate
informally without resort to the law for many problems that arise.
However, when the problems cannot be solved informally, the parties
can rely on the key provisions in the purchase order or acknowledgment
to protect their rights. The warranty, liability, damages, insurance and
indemnity may be the key provisions according to one interviewee.
Some parties such as OEMs may insist on LTAs. The lawyer should
advise the client of how the LTAs may control opportunistic behavior
by both parties and result in significant sharing of information that
may curtail shirking by suppliers and also advance innovation in
product development. The lawyer may also advise the client that the
greater the degree of investment by both the supplier and the buyer,
the more likely the relationship is to continue to be a productive one
with switching costs. However, lawyers should advise clients that even
LTAs may be subject to partial adoption or hedging by suppliers if they
feel that the buyer is acting opportunistically. If the buyer uses
proprietary information supplied by a supplier, it may chill other
suppliers from sharing such information in the future.
The lawyer might want to advise the client that some framework
contracts fail. Lawyers might want to encourage a buyer to make
reciprocal investments in training the supplier if the buyer wants the
relationship to be successful and to avoid what happened with Boeing
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and some of its suppliers.350 Alternatively, when representing a
supplier, a lawyer might advise its client that these networks can fail
when the buyer does not invest enough in coordination. In the case
of Boeing, an automated communication system failed to produce the
coordination that was needed to bring the Dreamliner to completion
on time.351 There are always alternative arrangements even for a
customizable good such as negotiating intellectual property rights to
protect sunk costs or acting as a contract manufacturer.
Lawyers can also offer one non-legal piece of advice that might be
quite important: develop a unique product.352 It is advantageous for a
supplier because, with a unique part, the supplier is not subject to price
pressures or to buyer “shopp[ing]” design improvements to
competitors.353 That means in principle the buyer could go elsewhere,
but it will not and the supplier’s investment will be protected.
CONCLUSION
Supply chains are subject to the same risks of opportunism as all
exchanges. The LTA provisions for information sharing protocols may
alleviate the problem of asymmetric information, reduce some of the
risks of the unreliability of the supplier and reduce uncertainty about
competence. They may also promote innovation and promote
informal enforcement of contracts.
However, there are other ways parties may wish to organize their
contracts other than through an LTA with formal information sharing
protocols but without a quantity term. Parties using alternative
arrangements can still resort to informal enforcement mechanisms,
even without an LTA. Their ability to sanction using informal
reputational controls will work best if there are ongoing relations or if
the buyer and seller are part of an extensive network. A network may be
effective even if a close relationship between the parties does not exist.

350. Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts, supra note 7, at 579. Navistar and Harley
are examples of OEMs that take a unique approach to improving their operations.
Navistar mandates that suppliers participate in web-based training. Harley’s supplier
training is highly formalized and can last up to three months.
351. Tang & Zimmerman, supra note 88, at 79–80.
352. It would prevent supplier shopping, as the manufacturer would likely commit
to only one seller.
353. WHITFORD, supra note 2, at 117. If a drawing is unique, it is hard to put it up
for bid at an auction or to shop it.
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If parties can achieve informal enforcement without an LTA, the
question of why parties enter such arrangements persists. One answer
is that parties who invest large sunk costs may be unwilling to invest
without the security of an LTA. Buyers may be unwilling to select a
supplier without the assurance of a guaranteed price over a long
period of time, at least where other suppliers are not readily available.
But regardless of the formal arrangements, the relationship may
break down and the question will arise, what role legal enforcement
should have in these supply chains? This Article’s initial empirical
research indicates that at least suppliers care most about the provisions
that will limit damages, provide indemnities, and constrain warranties.
The existence of informal arrangements will be effectively enforced
through self-enforcement on matters related to quality and the
networks can result in a virtuous circle of information sharing and
learning by monitoring and self-enforcement. However, networks are
subject to the same frictions as any exchange relationship and can fail.
One party may appropriate shared information for one party’s sole
benefit. In such cases, parties may privately protect themselves by
hedging or engaging in only partial adoption. In cases where there is
a breakdown when a matter is being litigated, the court should enforce
those provisions that specifically cover litigated matters, because they
are important to parties and parties never envisaged self-enforcement
of certain matters. Courts should also impose high-powered sanctions
if doing so will control opportunism that cannot be controlled by
contract and the law’s intervention will achieve the parties’ goals while
still minimizing costs. When the parties are at the end of their
relationship, low-powered sanctions may not be effective. Where the
gains from acting opportunistically are high enough, high-powered
sanctions may be needed for deterrence. This approach is consistent
with the parties’ own tradeoffs. They reserve informal enforcement to
cases where the costs of legal enforcement are not justified and seek
legal remedies when the informal sanctions break down and the harm
is great. Clients should be made aware of all of these issues so that they
can provide effective counsel on the uncertainties parties face in
controlling certain hazards, the private informal mechanisms that are
available, the danger of failure in networks, and the type of responses,
both private and legal, that may be available to parties.

